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2Abstract
This thesis studies the relationship between pension incentives and
formal labour market participation in a multi-tier dened contribu-
tion pension system. During 2008 a mayor pension reform was imple-
mented in Chile, changing simultaneously the redistributive welfare
and contributory tier of the system, introducing several elements to
boost formal labour market participation and reduce inequalities. The
expected pension wealth at retirement and the accrual rate have dier-
ently changed for dierent group of the population due to the reform.
I estimate the eects of the reform on formal labour market partici-
pation using two dierent empirical strategies: First, I use a dierence
in dierence estimator to address the eect of the expected pension
wealth on formal labour market participation. I exploit the dieren-
tial eects of the reform on individuals belonging to dierent groups
to gain identication. The endogenous pension wealth is instrumen-
talized using time and group dummies. Second, I solve and estimate a
dynamic consumption, labour supply and pension savings accumula-
tion life cycle structural model. It complements the existing literature
by incorporating the choice of two sectors in the labour market, the
formal and informal labour sectors and by allowing for intrahouse-
hold bargaining power. Households choose individuals' sector labour
supply and consumption in an environment with uncertainty given by
sectoral wage shocks, future marital status and future fertility choices.
The main results of the thesis are threefold. Firstly, the changes
in the nal pension wealth at retirement and the accrual rate have
reduced formal labour market participation. Secondly, the reform
has increased not only the self-nanced pension wealth but also has
importantly improved the nal pension due to the rst tier reform.
Finally, even though the nal pension changes have been positive for
both gender, the female pension improvement has been much higher
3than the rise for men reducing the gender inequalities.
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141 Introduction
Informality leaves workers unprotected against employment-related shocks
and old-age poverty. A large fraction of employees working informally has
historically been a major issue across developing countries; with informal em-
ployment composing 56% of urban jobs in Latin America in 2007 (Perry et al.
[2007]). Generous pension systems can reduce individuals' formal labour
market participation, eventually aecting their pension income at retirement
in systems in which both are structurally related. On the other hand, most
systems, other than simple individual savings have a de facto redistributive
role. Indeed many systems are designed with such redistribution in mind.
The issue of how to implement a welfare tier structure without increasing
informality but tackling inequality is an open empirical question. This the-
sis studies the relationship between pension incentives and informal labour
market participation. During 2008 a mayor pension reform was introduced
in Chile changing simultaneously the redistributive welfare and contribu-
tory tier of the system and introducing several elements to boost formal
labour market participation and reduce inequalities. The expected pension
wealth at retirement and the accrual rate1 have dierently changed for dif-
ferent group of the population due to the reform. I estimate the eects of
the reform on the labour market participation using two dierent empirical
strategies: First, I use a dierence in dierence estimator to address the ef-
fect of the expected pension wealth on formal labour market participation.
I exploit the dierential eects of the reform on individuals belonging to
several year-of-birth cohorts and dierent groups to gain identication. The
endogenous pension wealth is instrumentalized using time and group dum-
mies. Second, I solve and estimate a dynamic consumption, labour supply
and pension savings accumulation life cycle structural model. It comple-
ments the existing literature by incorporating the choice of two sectors in
1Dened as the rate of conversion of an additional dollar in future pension benets.
15the labour market, the formal and informal labour sectors and by allowing
for intrahousehold bargaining power. Households choose individuals' sector
labour supply and consumption in an environment with uncertainty given
by sectoral wage shocks, future marital status and future fertility choices.
The model enables workers to borrow against non-pension savings, consider-
ing current and future intrahousehold allocation in consumption and labour
supply and future possibilities to divorce, marriage and the birth of more
children.
Two main diering views have been put forward as possible explanations
for informality. Firstly, workers allocate themselves in each sector according
to their preferences and to sectoral wages and benets (Piggot et al. [2008],
Meghir et al. [2012]). Secondly, informality has been understood as a residual
sector coming from a segmented formal market (Magnac [1991], Cahuc and
Postel-Vinay [2002]) as a result of structural economic constraints, such as
a minimum wage legislation and other protection labour laws. The easier it
is to move from the formal to the informal sector, the larger the potential
eects on formal labour market participation are due to a new legislation.
For instance, additional pension benets will change the informal labour
market participation depending on how easy it is for the workers to move
from the informal sector to the formal one. The lack of barriers to entry
to the formal labour market increases the eects on the pension system's
coverage, and eventually scal expenditures, when new additional pension
benets are introduced.2
I dene formality according to the participation in the pension system,
considering an employee as working in the formal sector at period t if she
is contributing to the pension system at year t. The term informality has
dierent meaning for dierent people in dierent places. It is usually related
2To date, the empirical evidence about which view prevails is mixed (Contreras and
Puentes [2009], Maloney [1999], Meghir et al. [2012], Joubert [2012]).
16with several concepts such as: excessive regulation, low productivity, evasion
of the rule, underpayment or nonpayment of taxes and unprotected workers.
Even though these concepts are commonly linked, it is not possible to have
just one denition of informality capturing all of them. In this sense, the
nal chosen denition is given by the subject to be studied.
Pension systems aim mainly to guarantee a stable level of consumption
upon retirement and in some cases play an explicitly distributive role. Dif-
ferent systems generate dierent incentives to work either in the formal or
informal sector market and convey dierent redistributional mechanisms. De-
ned contribution (DC henceforth) pension systems operate through indi-
vidual contributions made during one's working lifetime in order to nance
future pensions. They have been broadly implemented in Latin America3 in
the 1980s and 1990s. Pay-as-you-go (PAYG henceforth) systems, in turn,
nance individuals' retirement with current workers' taxes. As the number
of pensioners per worker have risen due to longer life expectancy and lower
fertility rates, many European countries and The United States have been
discussing reforming their PAYG systems, noting the DC system as a possi-
ble candidate. However, even though the DC systems seem the appropriate
option instead of the nancially unbalanced PAYG systems, they have not
accomplished the expected coverage and replacement rates4 (Auerbach et al.
[2007], Attanasio et al. [2012a]). This has increased the need for govern-
3Since 1990, several countries have implemented a capitalization system, as a DC sys-
tem is sometimes called: Argentina (1994), Bolivia (1997), Colombia (1993), Costa Rica
(1995), Dominican Republic (2003), El Salvador (1998), Mexico (1997), Panama (2008),
Peru (1993), Uruguay (1996) and Slovakia (2005).
4Replacement rate is dened as the fraction between the pension income over some
measure of pre-retirement income, such as the average life cycle wage.
17ment expenditure in the same way that PAYG systems have required net
government transfer to cover their revenue shortfalls as the population ages.
On the other hand, individuals with low labour market attachment, such as
women and poor people, contribute to the system sporadically, eventually
retiring with low pensions and facing old-age poverty. Moreover, DC sys-
tems have tended to replicate the labour market inequalities and to avoid
inter-generational redistribution.
1.1 Chilean Dened Contribution Pension System.
In the early 1980s, Chile reformed its public pension system and insti-
tuted a mandatory DC pension system that combines its core contributory
structure with both a welfare pillar orientated to the poorer population and
a voluntary pillar aimed to top-up individuals' contributions. Several rea-
sons were provided in argument for replacing the existing PAYG system.
Among the most important concerns were the high individual contribution
rate, which varied between 16% and 23%, depending on the sector of eco-
nomic activity, and the low associated replacement rates. In the new system,
every aliate working with a labour contract was obliged to contribute to
the system, starting with her rst job, creating automatically an individ-
ual account which would accumulate her resources until retirement. These
accounts were (and are) privately managed by regulated Pension Fund Ad-
ministrators (PFA hereafter) and accumulate returns each period depending
on the nancial investment choices made by the PFA. The PFAs face some
signicant constraints on the type of investment they can undertake. The
old PAYG system continued working for individuals who decided to stay on
18it, but any worker was allowed to change to the new system until 1986. The
exodus to the new system was vast; as of 1982, around 1,500,000 workers
were contributing in the new system, and just 500,000 stayed in the PAYG.
The new system was highly advertised during its implementation, oering
a common low rate of contribution and promising higher future pensions.
However, in practice, pensions have been lower than their initial expected
value, generating low average replacement rates: 28% for women and 51% for
men in 2005.5 The main reason behind these ex-post low-average replacement
rates seems to be that many individuals do not contribute frequently enough
to the system. After more than 30 years since its implementation, the low
frequency of contributions appears as one of the main problems in the system,
which is particularly serious for groups with low labour market attachment,
such as women. The average frequency of contributions has been 42% for
women and 61% for men. For women, 44% of the non- contributed periods
correspond to periods of inactivity (CRP [2006]), reecting one of the features
of the Chilean labour market, namely its low female labour participation.
This lower female labour attachment, together with lower female wages and
longer female life expectancy have generated an important gender gap and
much higher prevalence of poverty and hardship among female elderly.
The crucial structural parameters characterizing the original DC system,
such as the contribution rate and the legal age of retirement, were chosen on
the basis of the demographic structure and the labour market characteristics
prevailing in the periods preceding the reform in 1981. However, Chile has
experienced important demographic and socioeconomic changes in the last
5Final report, 2006 Pension Reform Commission. See CRP [2006] in the References.
19three decades that could suggest an explanation for the system's failure to
achieve the expected results. Life expectancy at birth has increased from 71
in 1980 to 79 in 2005, requiring larger levels of accumulated pension wealth
in order to cover a longer period of retirement satisfactorily. Female labour
market participation jumped from 29% in 1986 to 37% in 2005, decreasing the
average number of contributions due to the fertility decisions made by women.
The fraction of employees working under temporary labour contracts or xed-
term contracts has increased during last decades. These types of contractual
relationship would have reduced the average frequency of contributions due
to the likely reduction in the continuity of labour histories.
The current Chilean pension system is referred to as a three-tier System,
because its main DC component comes on top of a basic pension and on
the bottom of a voluntary savings component. The Chilean pension arrange-
ments are a good example of a system designed to be in part funded and
also to include a taxpayer-subsidized redistributive element oering a safety
net for poorer individuals who either have not worked and saved enough
over their working life or have worked in mainly informal jobs and have not
contributed to the system. The second tier, sometimes called the core tier,
consists of a funded pension benet to be drawn at retirement from the ac-
count accumulated during the working life of an individual up to retirement.
Individual accounts are created automatically once the rst workers' contri-
butions are made. Formal workers make compulsory monthly contributions6
of 10%, which is saved in the individual accounts. These savings are man-
6Even though the system contributions are monthly based, I will use years as the
time-period relevant variable. This assumption enormously reduces the computing time
required by future estimations.
20aged by a private PFA, chosen by each worker, which invests the funds in
the national and international nancial market until the worker decides to re-
tire. As of October 2002, workers can choose among ve funds with dierent
combinations of risk and return. When workers do not choose any particular
fund, their savings are invested in a default fund dened by age. The FPAs'
investments are regulated in terms of the possible set of nancial instruments
to be chosen and on the proportion of foreign investments done. FPAs charge
an additional variable fee of 2%, which is used to cover the administration
costs and to nance a survivor and disability benet pension through an in-
surance company. Workers can move, without additional cost in the practice,
from one FPA to another one at any moment. Although the second tier is
mandatory for employees, it is voluntary for the self-employed. As a result,
only a very small fraction, around 5%, of the self-employed contribute to the
pension system every month.7 At the legal age of retirement8, 65 for men
and 60 for women, individuals can withdraw from the labour force and start
to receive a pension. Individuals can continue working and contributing to
the system after the legal age of retirement. In this sense, the legal age of
retirement is dened as the minimum age under which welfare pensions could
be received and individual accumulated funds could be withdrawn. Retirees
can choose mainly between two pension modalities, either a scheduled with-
drawal scheme, which is paid until funds run out, or an annuity scheme.
Regarding the former, the accumulated resources are still managed by the
7This in turn results in low pension benets. Final Report, 2006 Pension Reform
Commission. CRP [2006]
8Early retirement is allowed if the worker can nance a pension larger than or equal
to 150% of the Minimum Pension, described below, and 70% of the last 10 years average
wages.
21PFAs and invested in the nancial market during retirement. The annuities
are provided by insurance companies on payment of the individual's capital.9
The pension income at retirement, therefore, depends primarily on the
amount saved during the life cycle and upon the return to those savings. The
former is mainly determined by the wage prole and the frequency of con-
tributions observed during the life cycle. Thus, workers with low frequency
of contributions do not accumulate enough pension wealth, leading to low
pensions. On the other hand, as contributions accrue returns over the life
cycle, contributions made during the initial periods of the cycle bear more
weight than those made during the periods near retirement. Consequently,
individuals who do not participate in the pension system in their early work-
ing periods, such as women in their reproductive years, are more likely to end
up with low pensions. This has implied low replacement rates and important
inequalities as the system tends to replicate the labour market dierences.
In addition to the mandatory second tier, the pension system, before
2008, also had a dual-component redistributive rst tier composed of the
following:
￿ A contributory minimum pension, \Pension Minima Garantizada." To
be eligible for the PMG, the individual should have contributed to the
pension system's second tier for at least 240 months and should not
be able to self-nance the PMG with her accumulated pension contri-
9More than 60% of retirees at year 2005 have chosen an annuity scheme. See Mitchell
and Ruiz [2009].
22butions. In 2008, the PMG was CLP$ 96,390 (US$ 212).10 Therefore,
individuals with less attachment to the formal labour market, such as
women and the less skilled, would be less likely to contribute to the
pension system and would, consequently, be less able to fulll the con-
tribution requirement and obtain the PMG. Less than 37% of women
and 67% of men will have pensions above PMG for the period of 2020-
2025; moreover, 61% of women who will not accumulate enough to
self-nance a pension higher than PMG will also not satisfy the 240-
month requirement needed for receiving it (Berstein et al. [2005]).
￿ A means-tested welfare pension, \Pension Asistencial". To be eligible
for the PASIS, the individual had to comply with the means testing
embodied in the system and had to have no other pension entitlements.
The PASIS is allocated according to a poverty indicator, and it has been
usually given to retirees belonging to the poorest quantile. In 2008,
the PASIS was CLP$ 54,091 (US$ 119) a month, being nanced by
the government out of general taxation revenues. Since 2006, the used
poverty indicator for allocating most of the Chilean welfare subsidies
has been the Ficha de Proteccion Social (FPS). This indicator, used for
allocating both the PASIS and the new welfare pensions implemented
by the reform, is determined by taking into account a complete set of
socioeconomic household characteristics, such as incomes, household
size and its composition, health and years of education.11
10The exchange rate Chilean Pesos to American Dollars for October 2012 is CLP$ 1 =
US$ 0.0022.
11Modications to the FPS indicator were introduced during 2011 in order to allow for
a better measure of long-term household vulnerabilities.
23Finally, the third system's tier comes on top of the compulsory DC com-
ponent as a voluntary saving complement. Workers can save additional re-
sources into their individual accounts in order to increase their self-nanced
pensions. Voluntary savings are excluded from taxable income12 (ETT), be-
ing all taxes paid at retirement, and from the self-nanced pension wealth
used to determine eligibility for the welfare rst-tier pensions.
1.2 2008 Chilean Pension Reform.
In 2008, a major pension reform was implemented to tackle the main prob-
lems of the pension system, specically those related with low attachment to
the formal labour market and, consequently, low frequency of contributions.
In this sense, the reform aimed to increase participation in the pension sys-
tem, to reduce inequalities generated by the DC scheme, to prevent old-age
poverty, to guarantee a minimum and stable level of consumption upon re-
tirement, and to increase the welfare of women. The reform involves several
changes to the current system. First, two new components were introduced
in the welfare tier: a at non-contributory welfare pension (PBS hereafter)
intended to alleviate poverty for those not entitled to a second-tier bene-
t and a welfare pension complement (APS hereafter), intended to sustain
consumption by topping-up the self-funded second-tier pension. Second, dif-
ferent components to recognize the disadvantages generated by the structure
of the system, in particular among groups whose attachment has been tra-
12For monthly amounts below CLP$ 1,050,000 (US$ 2310) at 2009, adjusted annually
according ination.
24ditionally infrequent and/or irregular. Women, young workers, and the self-
employed were the explicit target of these incentives. These new elements
of the reform were aimed at fostering participation in the contributory and
voluntary pillar. They include a children subsidy obtained by every mother,
contributions to the pension system are subsidized for each child they have;
compensation upon divorce, there is now a pension savings compensation
upon divorce in favour of the worse-o member of the couple; male survivor
pensions, women will have to provide pension funds to leave a survivor pen-
sion benet to her husband and gender-dependent survival pension premium
rates.
As for young workers, they get a subsidy both to their wage, through the
employer, and to their contributions. The reform enables the self-employed
to be eligible for the benets in the rst tier and obliges them to participate
in the pension system.13 Lastly, new voluntary occupational saving plans
and new tax exemption schemes are introduced in the third tier.
The pre- and post-reform schemes are shown in Figure 1. The 45-degree
line represents the pure DC system in which self-saved pension wealth (hor-
izontal axis) becomes a nal pension (vertical axis) upon retirement. Before
reform, the green and blue lines represent either the means-tested PASIS or
the contributory PMG pension. After the reform, the red line shows the
minimum non-contributory pension, PBS, which is topped-up by the APS
subsidy. In this sense, the reform sets up a more comprehensive system in
which the redistributive and the mandatory tiers of the system are integrated
13From 2012 to 2014, the self-employed participate voluntarily in the system, but they
have to explicitly opt out to avoid participation. Starting in 2015, participation will be
compulsory and contributions will be done over 80% of gross earnings.
25with each other. The reform costs annually around 1.1% of GDP14, being
one the largest of the Chilean social reforms in recent years.
Figure 1: Multi-Tier System Structure











(PMG if retiree has




(PASIS if retiree complies
with the  means testing) 
(Contributory tier) 
w: 17%  m:12%
w: 24%  m:26%
Final pension
As I explained, workers contribute to the pension system, accumulating
pension wealth into individual accounts to self-nance future pensions upon
retirement. Therefore, individuals accrue pension wealth each period accord-
ing to their contributed wages and the associated earned returns for those
contributions. This accrual mechanism, combined with the welfare elements
of the system, generates particular incentives to contribute to the system and
then work formally. Importantly, the pension reform changes the expected
pension at retirement and the accrual rate through both the new welfare tier
in place and through the various mechanisms introduced to complement the
14According to forecasts by the Chilean Pension Regulator, \Superintendencia de Pen-
siones" (SPE), and the Budget Oce, \Direccion de Presupuesto" (DIPRES). See CRP
[2006] in the references.
26contributory tier. The change in the expected pension wealth at retirement
and the change in the expected accrual rate can be understood as an income
and substitution eect on the labour supply choices, respectively. These
changes are dierent for dierent groups of the population, not only because
some of the new incentives are explicitly targeted to specic groups, but also
because the younger cohorts have more time to react optimally to the reform.
Most individuals will experience both income and substitution eects as a
consequence of the reform. The former will typically decrease the propensity
to participate in the formal labour market, while the latter can go both ways,
depending on whether, for a specic individual, the rate of conversion of par-
ticipation in future pension benets (the accrual rate) increases or decreases.
Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, the reform has an ambiguous
eect on participation in the formal labour market. The individual eects on
the labour market depend on the worker's pre-reform situation and how the
nal pension and accrual rate change due to the reform. When aggregating
the income and the substitution eect, it is possible to determine the total
empirical eect on the individual formal labour market participation due to
the reform. Moreover, the aggregate nal eect will depend on how workers
are distributed across the Figure 1 budget constraint.
1.3 Elements of the reform to be evaluated.
Probably the largest change introduced by the 2008 reform is the reform
to the rst-tier system. The PMG and the PASIS are now substituted by
the PBS and the APS. The PBS welfare pension was started on July 1, 2008,
and intends to alleviate poverty among those not entitled to the second tier
27of the system. It is means tested using a poverty indicator FPS targeted to
the 40% poorest of the population older than 65 years old. The coverage was
gradually increased each year until 2012, when it reached the poorest 60%
of the elderly population. The PBS is a at non-contributory pension set at
CLP$ 60,000 (US$ 132) for 2008 and increasing to CLP$ 75,000 (US$ 165)
from 2009. This new welfare pension could be understood as the minimum
oor income that any retiree older than 65 years old, who belongs to the
60% poorest population will receive. The reform eliminates the number of
contributions as one of the eligibility conditions for receiving a minimum
pension.
The APS welfare pension complement, also started on July 1, 2008, in-
tends to sustain consumption by topping-up the funded second-tier pensions
between the PBS and a maximum-funded pension, PMAS, which was in-
creased gradually15 until it reached the value of CLP$ 255,000 (US$ 561) in
2012. The APS is decreasing in the funded pension and does not have, in the
same way as the PBS, a minimum contribution-period condition. It is dened
as APS=(PBS- PBS
PMAS*PB), where PB is the sum of the funded second-tier
pension plus any received survivor pension and any pension received from
the previous PAYG system.
These two new welfare pensions come to replace the PMG and PASIS
pensions described before, therefore changing completely the rst tier of the
system. These changes are illustrated in Figure 1 as shown in Section 1.2.
Before the reform, retirees at the bottom of the distribution (of second-tier
15The main features of the two new components of the redistributive tier are summarized
in Table 1.
28pension benets) could be divided into three groups: (i) those who received
their funded pension (the 45-degree line in Figure 1), (ii) those who received
the PMG (which was the case if the funded second tier pension was lower than
the PMG and the 240 months of contributions requirement was satised), and
(iii) those who received the PASIS pension (if the funded second-tier pension
is lower than PASIS and the retiree satises the means testing). After the
reform, the third group of retirees, receiving a PASIS before the reform, now
get a PBS, because of the weaker means testing criteria. The rst group
mentioned above (those receiving a pension lower than the PMG because
they did not satisfy the contributory requirement) are receiving a higher
level of pension, as indicated by the red line in Figure 1. Of those receiving
the PMG before the reform, however, some will receive a higher and some a
lower pension.16 The latter group is constituted by those who satised the
240-month contribution requirement and had not enough entitlements in the
second tier to self-nance a nal pension of CLP$ 75,000 (US$ 165); under
the new system, the PBS, while higher than their self-nanced pension, is
below the PMG.
In addition to the rst tier, the 2008 reform also introduced a number of
other elements that will be evaluated. The main items are as follows.
￿ A subsidy for every child ever born to the mother (implemented since
July 1, 2009). Every woman older than 65 years old who is aliated to
the system receives a subsidy of 1.8 times the minimum wage existing
16Workers older than 50 years old in 2008 will receive the higher pension, eith561er the
PMG or the post-reform pension.
29at the time of birth of every child.17 Subsidies earn returns since the
date of birth of the child until the date of retirement or from July 2009
until retirement in cases in which children were born before this date.
This specic element of the reform is designed to compensate women
for their lower frequency of contributions due to childbearing periods,
reducing gender inequality in pensions. Furthermore, this generates
incentives to participate in the formal labour market, as it is required
to be aliated to the pension system in order to receive the subsidy.
￿ Around 2% percent of the individual mandatory monthly contribution
is used for nancing survivor and disability insurance for each aliate.
Even though the risks of death and illness have been historically lower
for women than for men, the system has not recognized this fact, charg-
ing a common premium rate. Since July 1, 2009, the reform introduced
a mechanism which intends to recognize gender dierences in longevity
and disability risk. The premium rate for the survivor and disability
insurance is determined by an auction mechanism through which all
FPAs bid for managing the insurance. FPAs could oer dierent rates
for men and women, thus recognizing the dierence in their risks. Both
groups will be charged with the higher oered rate, but the dierence
will be incorporated in the individual accounts for women as part of
their contribution.
￿ Before October 1, 2008, survivor pensions were received just by wives;
this has been changed by the reform incorporating a survivor pension
17In 2009, it was equivalent to CLP$ 286,200 (US$ 630).
30benet to the husband as well. On the other hand, the reform intro-
duced a possible compensation upon divorce in favour of the worse-o
member of the couple. Compensation is determined by family courts as
a fraction (up to the half) of the accumulated resources of the best-o
member.18
18Table 1 summarize the main elements to be evaluated through the thesis.
31Table 1: 2008 Chilean Reform Structure
2008 CHILEAN PENSION REFORM 





To alleviate old age 
poverty
Flat pension of CLP




1. Belong to 40% poorest population
at 2008 (increasing 5% each year
until reach 60% in 2012). 2. Older
than 65 years old. 3. Not eligible for
contributory pension.
Welfare pension 
complement (APS).          
1st July 2008.
Incentivate 
participation in the 
system
Pension complement 
which decreases with 
self-financed pension 
PB.  APS=PBS- c*PB
1. Belong to 40% poorest population
(increasing  gradually until 60% in 
2012). 2. Older than 65 years  old. 
3.Eligible  for  a  contributory 
pension >0 and <PMaS
SUMMARY OF THE CHILEAN PENSION REFORM 2008
NEW ELEMENTS AIM  BENEFITS REQUIREMENTS
II. Compulsory Contributing Tier
Subsidy to the 
mother for every 
child.
1st July 2009.
To reduce gender 
inequality at old-age. 
Recognizing  the 
childbearing periods
Subsidy equal to 
(1.8*MW)*R.  For the 
period 07/2009-06/2010 
the subsidy was 
CLP$286,200
1. Women  must  be  affiliated,
receiving a survivor pension or be
eligible for PBS. 2. Older than 65
years old.
Gender dependent 





disability risks for 
men and women
Women receive in their 
individual accounts the 
difference between the 
male and women rate 
offered by AFPs
1. Women must be affiliated.
Compensation upon 
divorce and Male 
survivor pension. 1st 
October 2008.
To reduce gender 
inequality at old-age 
and to equal gender 
rights
Worst-off member will 
receive a fraction of 
partner´s accumulated 
funds. 
1. Just for divorces after October
2008. 2. Final amount is decided by
trial, will not be more than half of
the couple's funds.
Note:  MW is the minimum wage at the time of the birth of the child (t) and R is the rentability since (t) until 
retirement. For children born before 01/07/2009 the rentability is just from this date onwards.
Note:  US$1=CLP$0.0022, PMaS is the maximum pension such as one receives government pension complement. Its 
value is  CLP$70000 in 2008; CLP$120000 in 2009; CLP$150000 in 2010; CLP$200000 in 2011; CLP$255000 in 2012.
32The changes introduced to the welfare pensions, such as the replacement
of PMG and PASIS with the PBS and the APS have changed substantially
the nal pensions and the accrual rates. As it is clear from Figure 1, dierent
individuals experience dierent changes on their accrual rates. For instance,
an individual who was receiving the PMG before the reform, and then facing
a zero-accrual rate over a large region of her contributions, will face a positive
accrual rate after the reform, represented by the slope of the red line in Figure
1. On the other hand, an individual who was on the 45-degree line to the
left of CLP$255,000 (for instance, the wife of a relatively well-o husband
= who therefore did not qualify for PASIS = and who has relatively low
attachment to the labour market so that she had less than 240 months of
contribution) would now receive the PBS supplement and would have the
accrual rate relative to the post-reform situation. Needless to say, these
changes to accrual rates are also accompanied by changes to the level of
pension wealth. These changes dier among individuals depending on their
initial situation previous to the reform. Worker with low labour market
attachment will face dierent accrual rate and pension wealth changes due
to the reform than those workers with stable labour situations. Therefore,
the reform will aect labour market participation dierently for these groups.
There are several other elements incorporated in the 2008 reform which I
am not evaluating. These components target dierent groups, such as young
employees and the self-employed, starting on dierent dates (some of them
were active just after the last observed period in the data) and include some
general modications to the whole system, such as the elimination of the
xed fee charged by the PFAs and a new auction mechanism under which
33PFAs compete for administrating the funds of the new aliates. A complete
list is described in the next section.
1.4 Other components introduced by the reform.
￿ Self-employed contributions. From the 1st of January 2012, the self-
employed are incorporated gradually into the mandatory system. They
will be eligible for the rst-tier benets, but they must contribute an-
nually according to 80% of their gross earnings. From 2012 to 2014,
default-voluntary participation is introduced, in which workers have to
explicitly decide not to participate in the system. For the years 2012
and 2013 contributions will be made considering the 32% and 56% of
annual salary, respectively. After 2015, the participation is compulsory
and contributions are done over the 80% of annual salary from 2014
onward.
￿ Subsidy for young people's contributions. From the 1st of July 2011,
employees between 18 and 35 years old who earn a salary less than
1.5 times the minimum wage receive a subsidy for all of their rst
24 contributions. The subsidy will be equal to 5% of the minimum
wage at the period in which the contribution is done. This subsidy is
deposited into their individual accounts as part of their pension wealth.
Considering that this new element and the previous one will start to
be eective since 2011 and 2012, respectively, and then they will be
34active after the last observed period in the data, I do not expect an
importantly current eect on the observed labour market data due to
them.
￿ Subsidy for hiring young people. From the 1st of October 2008, em-
ployers receive a monthly subsidy. As in the previous case, the subsidy
is equal to 5% of the minimum wage, when they hire young workers
between 18 and 35 years old who are doing any of their rst 24 contri-
butions and earning a salary lower than 1.5 times the minimum wage
at that point in time.19
￿ Subsidy for voluntary contributions. From the 1stof October 2008, the
third tier of the system is subsidied for workers who choose the new tax
form (TTE) introduced for voluntary savings. In this case, employees
pay taxes for the amount saved at the moment of doing them and pay
taxes for the earned returns at retirement. Before the reform, volun-
tary savings were excluded from taxable income (ETT), and all taxes
were paid at retirement. Those workers choosing the rst tax scheme
option will receive a subsidy equal to 15% of the entire saved amount20.
In September 2010, the number of voluntary contributions operating
with this new tax regime was 7% of the total voluntary number of
contributions.21
19Two additional programs focused on the young workers (18-24 years old), Subsidio al
Empleo Juvenil and Jovenes Bicentenario, were implemented around the same time of the
reform implementation. Their benets are larger (and exclusive) than the ones associated
with the subsidy for hiring young people introduced by the reform. Therefore, most of the
employers have chosen the former ones.
20With a maximum of CLP$ 221,178 (US$ 487) in 2009. These values will be readjusted
each year according to the ination.
21According to the Regulator, Superintendencia de Pensiones de Chile.
35￿ Occupational voluntary saving plans. From the 1st of October 2008,
employers are allowed to set up collective voluntary saving plans for
their employees in which they can dene joint contributions. Employ-
ers have tax incentives for contributing to their employees accounts, as
those contributions are considered to be the company's expenditures
and therefore do not pay taxes. Employees will not only get the sub-
sidy given by the employer but also can get all of the available benets
for voluntary savings described above. Even though this element has
been operating for the past four years, the number of collective volun-
tary saving plans has been minor according to regulator information.
Therefore, I do not expect any important eect on the labour market
due to this element.
￿ Fixed-fee elimination. From the 1st of October 2008, the FPA xed
fees, charged before the reform for managing the individual accounts,
are abolished.
￿ New aliates auction. From the 1st of October 2008, new aliates to
the system are allocated to the winner FPA of an auction for the new
aliate portfolio. Aliates can choose another FPA after 24 months
of the original auction. This new mechanism aims to generate more
competition in the system, thus reducing the charged fees.
Before describing the pension entitlements used to estimate the reform's im-
pact, I briey discuss the used data in the next subsection.
361.5 Data.
In evaluating the pension reform, I will use two sources of data that
will complement each other: the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de
Protecci on Social, EPS) and the Chilean Pension System Administrative
Records. The EPS is a panel data nation-wide survey containing a rich set
of information about Chilean households and their participation in the labour
market and the social security system. The EPS was the rst attempt to built
it up a panel data survey in Latin America and the rst systematic eort to
collect household data about the Chilean pension system. See Arenas et al.
[2006] for a complete description about the aims and the relevance of the
EPS. It was initiated in 2002 and followed up during years 2004, 2006, and
2009, which provides me data before and after the reform. In particular, I
will use the information on job and contribution histories, assets, and the
usual range of socio-demographic individual characteristics. In addition, the
EPS survey can be linked with a wide range of administrative les covering
contribution and benets patterns. These Pension System Administrative
Records provide me with monthly earnings, contributions, fees paid, and
accumulated pension savings.
As was explained before, the two new elements of the rst tier are means
tested and are targeted to the 60% poorest of the population of those 65+
years old. This target group is dened by the FPS poverty indicator (Ficha
de Protection Social, FPS). This indicator, used for allocating the PASIS
and the new welfare pensions implemented by the reform, is determined by
taking into account a complete set of socioeconomic household characteristics
37such as permanent incomes, household size and composition, health status
and years of education. However, in 2011, the FPS was changed, and a new
instrument, called Instrumento Tecnico de Focalizacion (ITF), was intro-
duced for means testing.22 In general terms, both indicators are similar but
they use dierent sources of data and weigh dierently individuals within the
household according to age. To evaluate the redistributive elements of the
pension reform, one must identify the individuals in the EPS that belong to
the eligible group at retirement. As there is not available information about
the FPS for all the EPS interviews, I use an estimation of the ITF score to
allocate the welfare pensions. The ITF was computed using the self-reported
incomes in the survey. As I aim to unveil the eects of the reform on the
labour market participation before retirement, I only use information about
non-retired AFP aliates who are younger than 65 and older than 20 in all
of the EPS waves.23 Table 2 shows some descriptives for the used data.
22Detailed information about this new indicator, including its formula, can be found in
\Decreto Supremo N. 2, and Resolucion N. 155 and N. 164. Superintendencia de Pensiones
(SPE), Ministry of Work".
23As I mentioned earlier, it is possible to continue working after the legal age of retire-
ment. However, I am not considering those individuals who continued working after 65











Average Formality (Yes=1) 
Percapita Household Income* 
Finished Primary (Yes=1) 
Finished Secondary (Yes=1) 
Finished College (Yes=1) 0.21 0.28
Descriptives - Year 2009
*Monthly value. Household Income includes all self-reported labor incomes, governmental 
subsidies, pensions and rents from the EPS2009. CLP$1=US$ 0.0022 at 2012
1.6 Pension entitlements.
As the expected pension wealth and the accrual rate will be crucial in my
future estimations, it is important to show explicitly how they are computed
under the pre and post reform scenarios. Hereafter I will distinguish between
pension wealth and pension. The former refers to the self-saved accumulated
resources into the individual accounts and the later refers to the nal pension
nanced with the pension wealth. The pension wealth turns on a pension
according to, among other things, the welfare tier structure. The present
value24 of the expected accumulated pension wealth upon retirement (R) in
24To make the things simpler I am not writing the discount factor, which is assumed to
be equal to 0.98, in the following formulas.




















(1 + rj)] + WEij + RBiR (1)
The rst sum is the total observed accumulated pension until period t.
The elements following the expectation incorporated the unobserved future
returns earned for the contributions made before t and all of the future con-
tributions and their own returns until retirement R. WEij captures the new
forecasted elements introduced by the reform, such as the child subsidy and
compensation upon divorce, contij is the annual contribution described be-
low, r is the interest rate earned by the accumulated resources. Workers
can choose among 5 funds with dierent combinations of risk and return.
When workers do not choose any funds their savings are invested among
three default funds dened by age. I assume dierent interest rates by age
according to the default multifunds structure. Female younger workers be-
tween 18 and 35 years old have the riskier default fund, named B. Female
workers between 36 and 50 years old and 51 and 65 years old are allocated to
less riskier default funds C and D, respectively.25 As age increases, the funds'
risk decreases. Fund B, C and D returns are assumed to be equal to 11%, 9%
and 7%, respectively. These choices are consistent with the average return
of the last 20 years of the Chilean DC system, which has been around 9%
25The age thresholds dening the default funds are gender dependent. Male workers
between 36 and 55 years old and 56 years old onward are allocated to default funds C and
D, respectively.
40(CRP [2006]). In particular, I observe whether workers have chosen a specic
fund in the year 2009; for these cases I assume that individuals will hold the
same fund for all remaining ages dening the current workers' default fund.
RBiR (recognition bond) is an nancial instrument created and issued by the
Government for capturing any old contributions to the PAYG system.26
contij = wij  ({[W
F]{[W
E])
Where { is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the expression in
the brackets is true and W Fand W E take the value of 1 if individual i is a


















(1 + rj){[WO] ; 0 < i < 0:5
The rst two terms in equation (2) are the compensation upon divorce
introduced by the reform. Family courts will determine if one of the members
must be compensated, in which case she will receive a fraction i of her
partner's accumulated resources, CAtd, when divorce happens at period j =
26I observe the RB value for those aliates who have claimed it. However, for aliates
who have not claimed the recognition bond, I assume their values according to groups
dened by education, age and cohort groups.
41td.27 Wo (Bo) takes the value of 1 if individual i is considered by the
court as the worse(better)-o member. The nal summation includes all of
the subsidies received for each child. Where MW is the minimum wage at
period tb28, Tc is the total number of children, tb(nc)29 is the period in which
child number nc was born and WO takes the value of 1 if individual i is a
woman. Finally, using the total expected accumulated self-nanced pension
wealth I compute pensions according the following formulas in the pre and
post-reform scenario, respectively.
Pre-reform pensions are computed considering the cases when retirees
receive either a PMG or the PASIS at retirement.
PiR =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <














Retirees self-nance pensions according to the accumulated pension wealth
under the non-reform scenario, receive a PMG if the pension is below the
value of the minimum pension at retirement and the 240 months of contribu-
tions requirement is satised and receive a PASIS if the self-nanced pension
27Compensation upon divorce is for divorces after 2008 only.
28I am assuming a rate of growth of 3% for the minimum wage in all future periods.
29For children born before the reform, the bond receives returns since 2008.
42is lower than this value and the means tested requirement is satised.30 The
CNUiR is a factor that incorporates the individual's life expectancy.31
Pensions after the reform are determined by the following structure:
PiR =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <




and i 2 60% poorest
EtPWiR
12CNUiR + (PBS   PBS
PMaS  PBiR) if 0 <
EtPWiR
12CNUiR  PMaS
and i 2 60% poorest
EtPWiR
12CNUiR if PMas <
EtPWiR
(12CNUiR)
or i 2 40% richest
(4)
Where PBS is the new non-contributory welfare pension, PMaS is an
upper-limit pension32 such as aliates receive a pension complement dened
as APS = (PBS   PBS
PMaS  PBiR), PBiR is the sum of the self-nanced
pension plus any received survivor pension and any pension received from
the past PAYG system.
30PASIS is allocated according to the ITF poverty indicator and it has been usually
given to retirees belonging to the rst quantile.
31All of the computations were done using stata codes provided by the Chilean pension









24 Where lx= lx 1(1   qi;x 1;R 1) is the number of people alive at the age x in period
R,(1 qi;x 1;R 1) is the probability to die at age x 1 in period R 1 and r is the relevant
interest rate used to compute phased withdrawals (Norma 79, Ministerio del Trabajo y
Planicacion Social de Chile), which is assumed equal to 4.5%. If the retiree has potential
survivors, the nal retiree's CNU is the sum of the survivors' CNU and his ownCNU.
32The PBS pension is readjusted annually according to ination. I am assuming an
annual rate of growth of 3%.
432 A Reduced Form Approach Evaluation
This section estimates the impact of the 2008 Chilean pension reform over
the labour market focusing mainly on female labour market participation
and pensions at retirement. In particular, I use a version of the \dierence
in dierences" estimator to address the eect of the accumulated pension
wealth and pension on the formal and informal labour market participation.
In doing so, I will follow the approach used by Attanasio and Rodhwedder
[2003] and Attanasio and Brugiavini [2003], who estimate the substitution
eect on saving rates induced by the pension reforms implemented in UK and
Italy, respectively. This approach uses changes in expected pension wealth
and pensions across groups and time in order to estimate the relationship
between pension wealth and saving rates. I will estimate the relationship
between pension wealth/accrual rate and participation rates to the formal
and informal labour market.
The main results of this section are twofold. Firstly, the changes in the
nal pension wealth at retirement and the accrual rate have reduced formal
labour market participation. The probability to contribute to pension sys-
tem has decreased as a result of the reform, reducing the participation in the
formal labour market by around 4.1% for those workers older than 40 years
old. The results dier by gender and age. The reform reduces the probabil-
ity of being formal by 3.2% and 2.8% for women and men between 56 and
65 years old, respectively. Secondly, the reform has increased not only the
self-nanced pension wealth, due to the dierent mechanisms or subsidies
received during the accumulation period, but also has importantly improved
44the nal pension due to the rst tier reform. For those workers retiring be-
fore 2015, the self-nanced pension wealth and the nal pension will increase
in average by 0.6% and 15%, respectively. Even though the nal pension
changes have been positive for both gender, the female pension improvement
has been 56% higher than the rise for men reducing importantly the gender
inequalities. On the other hand, there are several outcomes of interest that
I have analyzed, such as the eect of the reform on the poverty levels or the
eect of having an additional child on labour market participation after the
reform.
2.1 Methodology.
The nature of the pension system is likely to aect labour market deci-
sions. In its simplest form, the life-cycle model predicts that the expected
future income aects the incentives to participate in the labour market and
thus to contribute to the pension system. Indeed, it seems that some of the
changes introduced by the 2008 reform were motivated by the perceived need
to change the incentives to participate into the formal labour market. For
example, while before the reform poor informal workers receiving the PASIS
had little incentives to contribute (as were not likely to meet the 240 con-
tributions and then not likely to be eligible for a PMG), they would now be
actually encouraged to participate as they would get the APS. The main goals
of the reform were to guarantee a minimum and stable level of consumption
upon retirement, preventing old-age poverty and reducing gender inequali-
ties. In order to comply these goals two types of mechanisms were mainly
introduced by the reform: Firstly, a set of dierent incentives throughout
45the labour life cycle, such as the child subsidy, the divorce compensation and
the disability insurance compensation. They change the individual pension
wealth during the working life allowing to self-nance a higher pension at re-
tirement. Secondly, the changes introduced to the welfare pensions, such as
the PBS and the APS. They change implicitly the expected pension wealth
that workers perceive to have. Before the reform, workers who did not have
enough pension wealth to self-nance a pension above the PMG, but satisfy
the contributory requirements such as they obtain a PMG, have implicitly
a pension wealth equivalent to the one to self-nance a PMG. In this sense,
as the reform changed the system's rst tier, the expected pension wealth at
retirement not only has changed as a result of the new subsidies operating
during the accumulation periods but also as a result of the changes in the
welfare pensions.
Both, the new welfare components and the dierent other elements will
change the expected pension at retirement, which can be understood as an
income eect. Retirees receiving a PASIS or a self-nanced pension lower
than the PMG will get a higher pension under the post reform structure. This
group of workers faces a negative income eect which discourage participation
in the formal labour market. On the other hand, the reform changes the
pension accruing rate for any extra worked year. Workers receiving before
the reform a self-nanced pension (lower than the PMG) will get less extra
pension for any extra saved pension wealth as the new subsidy introduced by
the reform is decreasing in the pension wealth. This new accrual rate can be
understood as a substitution eect generated by the reform. In estimating the
eect of the pension reform, I will need to compute expected pension wealth
46at time t for each individual upon retirement and the expected accrual rate
at retirement of working the current year t, i.e. the pension benets accruing
due to work in this period. In doing so, I will need to estimate the future
patterns of contributions to the pension systems and wage proles, fertility
choices, divorce probability and any relevant variable for the new elements
of the reform.
As the reform aects dierently individuals in dierent periods across
the life cycle, the short and long run eects of the reform will dier. This
happens mainly because the reform targets groups in dierent periods of their
life cycle, such as women in their fertility periods and young employees, and
because younger cohorts have more time to react optimally to the incentives
introduced by the reform. While pension wealth can have a negative eect
on current work, the accrual rate is expected to act positively as it reects
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i + it (6)
where Yit is the discrete labour supply taking the value of 1 if individual i
is working in the formal sector33 at year t and 0 otherwise, Xit is a vector of
controls including usual socioeconomic and demographic variables, EtPWiR
33As I explained before, I dene formality according to participation in the pension
system. I consider an employee as working in the formal sector at period t if she is
contributing in the pension system at year t. All workers having a contract must contribute
compulsory in the system. As self-employed contribute voluntary in the pension system,
there is an important fraction of them considered as informal workers.
47is the expected (at time t) nal pension wealth at retirement (R), EtARiR
is the expected accrual rate at retirement of working the current year t,
i.e. the pension benets accruing due to work in this period. The accrual
rate as well as pension wealth were aected by the 2008 reform. Finally, 
and  represents time and group eects, respectively. Thus, the parameters
of interest are  and  which represent the eect of the change in pension
wealth and the accrual rate due to the reform on the formal labour market
participation in t. The methodological problems are reected into the fact
that nal pension wealth PW and the accrual rate AR will be correlated with
the residual term i+it. If this endogeneity is not taken care of, the estimates
of ,  and all the other parameters in equation (6) will be inconsistent. To
overcome this problem, I will instrument with time dummies interacted with
group dummies, which will be dened to capture systematic dierences in
pension wealth and accrual rate. In other words, I will use a version of the
\dierence in dierences" approach, whose key assumption is that the overall
trends in the outcome variables of the dierent groups are the same, once
the outcomes have been scaled appropriately.
As mentioned earlier, the reform's eligibility conditions, such as being
poor, young or female, will allow me to dene groups for whom the change
in the expected self-nanced pension wealth at retirement or the expected
pension due to the reform diers. The nal pension wealth diers of the
self-nanced pension wealth because the former considers the implicitly ac-
cumulated resources that are needed to nance a pension taking into account
the welfare pension that a retiree might receive. Before the reform, workers
who did not have enough pension wealth to self-nance a pension above the
48PMG, but satisfy the 20 years contributory requirements, have implicitly
a nal pension wealth equivalent to the one to self-nance a PMG. In this
sense, as the reform changed the system's rst tier, the expected pension
wealth at retirement not only changed as a result of the new subsidies oper-
ating during the accumulation periods but also as a result of the changes in
the welfare pensions. Therefore, both measures, the expected nal pension
wealth, EtPWiR, and expected pension, EtPiR, could be used as relevant
pension system's outcomes. However, working with the former one allow me
to avoid to deal with the pension modality choice that workers must do at re-
tirement. I will use the interaction of group dummies with time dummies as
instruments for PW variation in equation (6). In this manner I will take care
of unobserved heterogeneity and thus will be able to identify the causal eect
of the pension reform on labour market participation (and other outcomes).
Thus, one crucial aspect of this methodology is the computation of EtPWiR
and EtARiR at each period t. As I have said before, pension wealth depends
mainly on the life-cycle wage prole, labour market participation and the
various components of the pension system in place. The entire analysis is
based on the assumption that individuals expect the system to be permanent.
I propose the following estimation strategy. First I will construct expected
nal pension wealth and accrual rates, based on the observable history of the
individual and on forecasts of their future labour market paths. However,
these measures are endogenous because they are based on past, current and
future history, which is correlated with the unobserved individual character-
istics. Hence I propose to regress these measures on interactions of cohort,
gender and time dummies and use the predicted residuals as a new regressor
49in equation (6).34 The instruments capture the dierential way that individ-
uals will be aected by the reform for the exogenous reason of when they
were born and because of their gender. One important diculty in calculat-
ing pension wealth is that future labour supply will change as well as current
one, as a result of the reform. In order to capture this relationship completely
a fully specied dynamic model, as the one showed in Section 3, should be
used. Here I will have to experiment with alternative scenarios about the
probabilities to contribute for the unobserved future periods.
To capture permanent dierences across cohorts and gender as well as
secular trends I also include in the equation cohort dummies, gender dummy
and time dummies. Thus the eect of pension wealth and accrual rates is
captured purely by the dierential impact that the reform has had on accrual
rates and pension wealth for the dierent groups. The model is discrete
and hence I must either use semi-parametric methods or estimate the model
using a logit/probit; this assumes that the pension wealth, the accrual rate
and participation are jointly logistic/normal conditional on the remaining
observables.
In order to compute the expected nal pension wealth and the accrual
rate I predicted future contributions in the pension system using the model
described in the next subsection. Once expected pension wealth at retirement
is computed, the welfare tier before and after the reform is introduced using
the ITF indicator described in the Section 1.5.
34I report the results obtained using the standard IV approach as well, i.e using fore-
casted values for the endogenous variables in the main equation.
502.2 Proles.
2.2.1 Earnings and contributions proles.
The elements introduced by the reform create dierent incentives aect-
ing not only the current individual's labour market decisions but also their
complete life-cycle prole of choices. I observe self-reported wages and for-
mal labour market participation from year 2002 to 2009. Using them and
other EPS survey information, I estimate equations for labour market par-
ticipation, sector choice (formal/informal) and wages. These enable me to
forecast for each individual the earnings in future periods in which I do not
observe data. At each period t individual i decides to work Hit = 1 or not
to work Hit = 0. Workers could choose between the formal Fit = 1 and
the informal labour market sector Fit = 0, receiving after-tax wages wF=1
it
and wF=0
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51Where it and it are distributed N(0;1), it and it are shocks distributed
according to a bivariate normal distribution N(;) and i is a common
unobservable heterogeneity distributed according to N(;2
). Including 
as an outcome of the estimation process allows me to control for dierent
preferences across the population. The set of regressors contain the usual
socio-economic and demographic variables. Where Qit is a vector including
age, gender, educational dummies, cohort dummies and year dummies; Zit
includes the complete set of variables in Qit and the marital status and the
number of children by age, nally Xit incorporates the all previous variables
and the interaction between the number of children and gender. Employees
choose to work in the formal sector according to the relative wages, benets
and preferences for each sector. Employees with high risk aversion could
prefer to work in the formal sector as they will get the social security net.
However, working in the informal sector could be associated with more ex-
ibility, which is valued for certain types of workers. I estimate the system by
maximum likelihood35 using just two points on the domain of , which are
estimated jointly with their associated probabilities (Laird [1978], Lindsay
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52[1983] and Heckman and Singer [1984]). Results are used for forecasting in-
dividual wages on the future periods, allowing me to compute the expected
accumulated resources at retirement.
The equation system estimations are reported in Table 3 and 4, as shown
below. The results for the formal and informal wage proles, shown in the
rst and second column, respectively, follow the same tendency typically
found in the literature. The wages increase throughout the life cycle with
a decreasing rate; male workers earn higher wages than women, and the
more educated the employee is, the higher the wages are. Column 3 shows
the estimated parameters for the participation in the formal labour market.
The probability to participate in the formal sector is highly explained by
educational level; having a degree is one of the main variables explaining
formality. The results for participation in the labour market are displayed in
the last column. As I mentioned before, women participate less in the labour
market than men do. Moreover, the gender dierence is even greater when I
consider married women and women with children.36
36I included interactive variables between the number of children and sex, which are not
shown in the table as a result of edition.
53Table 3: Earning Proles Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Wage Formal Wage Informal Formal=1 Participation=1
Sex (1=Men) 0.316*** 0.429*** ‐0.193*** 0.253***
(0.00676) (0.0277) (0.0319) (0.0224)
Age  0.0305*** 0.0415** ‐0.000344 0.130***
(0.00436) (0.0184) (0.0109) (0.00727)
Age 2 ‐0.000317*** ‐0.000555*** 0.000111 ‐0.00147***
(5.21e‐05) (0.000210) (0.000132) (8.55e‐05)
Primary (1=Yes) 0.312*** 0.430*** 0.244*** 0.229***
(0.0110) (0.0340) (0.0243) (0.0159)
Secondary (1=Yes) 0.509*** 0.641*** 0.384*** 0.373***
(0.0119) (0.0419) (0.0270) (0.0186)
Degree (1=Yes) 1.019*** 1.016*** 0.615*** 0.361***
(0.0116) (0.0482) (0.0280) (0.0189)




Num. Children 0‐3 years 0.0965*** ‐0.174***
(0.0215) (0.0194)
Num. Children 4‐5 years 0.0101 ‐0.0766***
(0.0257) (0.0239)
Num. Children 6‐13 years ‐0.0236** ‐0.0997***
(0.0118) (0.0103)
Num. Children 14‐18 years ‐0.0409*** ‐0.0305**
(0.0142) (0.0122)
Constant 24.28*** 12.51*** 6.659***
(0.891) (0.421) (0.536)
Observations 78036 78036 78036 78036
Std. errors in parentheses 
*** pvalue<0.01, **
Maximum Likelihood System Estimation
Std. errors  in parentheses. Dummies year and cohort are included in the estimations. 
ΎΎΎƉǀĂůƵĞфϬ͘Ϭϭ͕ΎΎƉǀĂůƵĞфϬ͘Ϭϱ͕ΎƉǀĂůƵĞфϬ͘ϭ
The next table shows the estimations for the common unobservable het-
erogeneity , for two points of domain 1 and 2 with probability  and 1-;
respectively.37 The higher the value for the individual unobservable hetero-
geneity, the higher the probability to participate in the formal labour market
sector. The results could be interpreted as the existence of two groups within
37This is similar to the assumption that  is distributed discretely.
54the population. The rst group, around 30% of the population ( = 0:315),
has lower preferences for the formal labour market (1 =  3:309) and the
second group, around 70% of the population, has higher preferences for work-
ing formally (2= -2.062). The variances for the time-varying shocks, gt and
gt, are estimated jointly, F=1 and F=0, with the system. Both shocks have
dierent volatility, as the results indicate.
Table 4: Earning Common Heterogeneity Estimation
Modelling  Heterogeneity
Variables    Coefficients    Std. dev.
Σ


















***  p< 0.01 **  p< 0.05 * p< 0.1
 Coefficients equations 
The four-system equation estimations control for selection and allow me
to forecast those non-observed individuals' period-sector data. Figures 2
and 3 show the predicted average wages and formal participation rates by
gender and dierent cohorts. I can observe the usual bump-shaped life cycle
wage and labour market participation prole. The left-side graph of Figure 2
conrms the low female labour market participation highly debated in Chile.
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2.2.2 Child Subsidy.
As the reformed system includes a subsidy for every mother, I model how
many children a woman will have during her lifetime. I do this by estimating
a simple discrete choice model for the probability of having a child in period
t, conditional on having C children in t   1, age, education E, and marital
status M.38
38I assume that individuals expect the same number of children following the reform.
Even though it could be argued that the reform will change the fertility choices I do not
model the choice of having children.
56P(Cgt = 1jCgt 1;agegt;Mgt;Eg) = (Xgt)
I estimate the equation above by maximum likelihood assuming random
eects. The results are shown in the next Table. As is expected, individuals
who are married have a higher probability of having a child than those who
are single and individuals who have more years of education have a lower
probability of having a child.


































z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 Estimates the probability to have a child. Probit RE
 Delta Child=1 
Using these estimations I forecasted for each individual the probability
58to have a child conditional on the set of used regressors. Figure 4 shows the
average forecasted probability for each cohort of having a child at each age.
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With these results on hand, I then impute to each individual-period a
child if a randomly generated number falls within the prediction of the above
equation. As I now have the complete fertility prole for each worker, I am
able to compute the subsidy that every women will receive at retirement
for each born child. The bottom Figure 5 shows the average subsidy for
each cohort. As I explained in Section 1.3, the subsidy for each child is
59equal to 1.8 times the minimum wage existing at the time of birth of the
child.39 Subsidies earn returns since the date of birth of the child until
the date of retirement or from July 2009 until retirement in cases in which
children were born before this date. Therefore, younger cohorts get higher
amounts as subsidy, because, instead of probably having fewer children than
the older cohorts, they will earn returns during more periods. The average
child subsidy at retirement for the cohort born in the 1960s will be CLP$
3,076,090 (US$ 6,767), which represents around 9% of the total expected (at
year 2010) accumulated resources at retirement.40
2.2.3 Compensation upon divorce.
Expected benets received as compensation upon divorce should be in-
cluded in the pension wealth computations. To achieve this, I need to com-
pute the probability of divorce and the expected compensation amounts de-
cided upon by family courts. I will then impute to each individual-period a
forecasted expected compensation amount.
I observe the individual's marriage date and the marital status in the
three last waves of the EPS. With this information I estimate the probability
of divorce using a proportional hazard model. The probability of divorce
for individual i in period j = f[2004   2006];[2006   2009]g is modeled as a
function of a set of socioeconomic and demographic variables, which include
age, sex, education E, number of children C, years of marriage Y M and
dummy variables controlling for cohort eects Dc. The hazard rate function,
39In 2009, it was equivalent to CLP$ 286,200 (US$ 630). I assumed an annual rate of
growth of 3%.
40Including all the elements introduced by the reform detailed previously.
60denoted by h(j), or the instantaneous failure rate at time t could be written
as
h(j) = ho(j)exp(1agej + 2sex + 3Ej + 4Cj + 5Y Mj + 6Dc)
Table 6 shows the results for the hazard ratios from a proportional Cox
model estimation.






Years as married 1.036
(2.85)**
Total number of children 1.297
(2.73)**









z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Hazard ratios from Cox proportional model estimates 
for the probability of divorce
61The probability of divorce, conditional on being married, decreases with
age but increases with the number of years of marriage. The proportion of
divorced individuals varies positively with educational level. For example,
for those who have nished a degree, the probability of divorce is 36% higher
than for those who have not nished primary school.
In order to be able to forecast the unconditional probability of divorce
that an individual will face in each future period, I need to estimate the
probability to get married. The probability to get married is estimated using
a proportional hazard model in the same way that I did with the probability
of divorce. Table 7 shows the results about the marriage choices estimations.






Dummy Cohabiting (Yes=1) 2.76
(11.44)**
Number of Children 1.115
(4.07)**
Delta Children 2004-2006 1.231
(-1.85)









z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Hazard ratios from Cox proportional model estimates 
for the probability of marriage
The last two waves of the EPS contain information about the partners'
contribution patterns. Specically, the surveys include two questions which
allow me to gure out which individual within the couple could be considered
as the worse-o member upon divorce. Using the information provided by
the two following questions in the EPS, I computed an indicator in order to
determine who could be considered as the worse-o member, in terms of the
pension system participation, during the marriage. I basically recorded the
63answers creating an indicator between 0 and 1 in the following manner:
1. Did your partner work frequently during the relationship?
(a) Most of the time=1.
(b) Almost half of the time=0.5.
(c) For a little time=0.25.
(d) Did not work at all=0.
2. How frequently did your partner make contributions when she/he was
working?
(a) All the time (monthly)=1.
(b) Over half the time=0.75.
(c) Half of the time=0.5.
(d) Under half of the time=0.25.
(e) Occasionally contributed=0.
With the product of these two new recorded variables, for each at least once
married interviewed, I created the worse/better indicator. Its estimated ker-
nel density is shown by gender in the Figure 6. The higher the indicator,
64the higher the partner's frequency of contributions reported by the indi-
vidual. For all future periods and for all single individuals I imputed the
indicator using age, education and gender groups. Finally, combining this
indicator with the individual's frequency of contributions I imputed an indi-
vidual as the worse-o member (the better-o member) upon divorce in case
the worse/better-o indicator is above 0.8 (below 0.2) and her frequency of
contribution is below 0.2 (above 0.8).

























Combining this information with the unconditionally forecasted proba-
bility of divorce, the aliates' accumulated pension wealth at each period
and assuming a compensation fraction equal to 30% of the partner pension
wealth, I then imputed for each aliate an expected compensation in the
case of divorce. In the same way that I did with the child subsidy, I am
assuming here that the reform does not change the expected probability of
divorce. Individuals compute their expectations about the probability of be-
ing married without taking into account the incentives introduced by the
reform. This simplies enormously the computations and avoids me having
65to deal with the potential eects of the reform on marital status.
Figure 7 displays the simulated compensation upon divorce by sex.
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2.2.4 Survivor pension.
Before 2008, only the wives had the right to receive a survivor pension.
However, the reform introduced a survivor pension for the husband in case his
wife passes away. When workers choose the annuity modality as a pension,
they exchange with an insurance company their accumulated resources for
a xed pension upon retirement. In this bargaining process, the insurance
companies take into account the risk of death of the pensioner's partner.
Thus, it is plausible to expect a decrease in the female annuity values, because
after the reform the cost for the insurance companies has risen, as they should
possibly pay a survivor pension. On the other hand, as I saw in Section 1.6,
phased withdrawal computation considers the partner's survivor probability
66and then it will change when this new mechanism is introduced. To assess
the extent of this new element and its impact on the nal pensions, I simulate
the female pensions considering both scenarios, nancing a survivor pension
and not.41 Figure 8 shows how the frequency of the monthly female self-
nanced pension moved slightly to the left when this new element is taken
into account.
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2.2.5 Disability Insurance.
Men and women pay the same premium rate for a compulsory disability
insurance before the reform. Around 2% of the monthly contributions was
used to nance the insurance. An auction mechanism was incorporated with
the reform, in which all FPAs must bid a gender-dependent premium rate.
The dierence between the male and female premium rate is transferred each
period into the women's individual accounts earning returns upon retirement.
41Given that I am forecasting marital status, as I previously explained in Section 2.2.3,
I do not observe the partner's age for those individuals with imputed marital status. I am
assuming that men are two years older than women.
67For future periods, I am assuming for every women the average observed pre-
mium rate dierence since 2008 equal to 0.002 (Reyes [2009]). Figure 9 shows
the simulated average disability insurance subsidy by cohorts. Younger co-
horts will get a higher subsidy because they will receive the monthly subsidy
during more periods, earning at the same time the associated returns until
retirement.
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The model captures all elements introduced by the reform through the
nal pension wealth. The most important components are the two new wel-
fare pensions introduced in the rst tier. Both of them constitute around
87% of the additional total nal pension wealth due to the reform. On the
other hand, the child subsidy, the divorce compensation, the survivor new
pension mechanism and the disability insurance premium represent 9%, 3%,
0.3%, and 0.7% of the total additional nal pension wealth, respectively. The
model incorporates aggregate demographic changes in the economy through
the dierences in the estimated wages by cohort, the forecasted divorce and
68marital patterns through the life cycle and the modeled fertility choices.
Market labour regulations are captured by the pension system main frame.42
2.3 Pension wealth and accrual rate.
Finally, after assessing the value of all subsidies and incorporating all
mechanisms introduced by the reform and listed in Section 1.3, I computed
both the expected accumulated pension wealth and accrual rate at retire-
ment for periods t = f2002;::;2009g. I use the administrative records, which
contain disaggregated information about the accumulated pension wealth for
all years previous to 2005, and the EPS, which has information about contri-
butions between 2005 and 2009. Future contributions were simulated using
the predicted wages and frequency of contributions obtained from the esti-
mated system explained in Section 2.2.1. I nish incorporating the simulated
child subsidy, compensation upon divorce, survivor pension reform and the
disability insurance compensation. The next two gures show the expected
(at year t) pension wealth at retirement by gender and cohort. There are
dierences not only in the level of the cohorts' pension wealth but also in
its rate of growth. Particularly, the change of the EtPWiR in 2008, the year
of the reform, diers importantly by cohort and sex. Younger cohorts have
more time to react optimally to the reform and several mechanisms were
introduced having themselves and women as specic targets.
42Clearly, there are some components of the labour market which are not considered,
such as the unemployment insurance and the health insurance system. They are obvious
extensions of this model.
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Expected Pension Wealth for Men
There are mainly two things that could be explaining the PW change in
2008. First, the pension reform itself, and second, the nancial crisis that
happened around the same time.43 As I explained before, workers can invest
their accumulated resources in funds with dierent combinations of risk and
return. Nevertheless, in case they do not show explicitly any preference for
a particular fund, the accumulated resources are invested automatically in a
default fund. The default funds have a particular combination of risk and
return which varies according to the age. Since 2004 onwards only a 30%
of the workers have chosen explicitly their funds44, we can expect that the
observed decline of the pension funds' value45 during the crisis had been
dierently across cohorts, compensating the increment due to the reform.
On the other hand, the accrual rate will be dierent before and after the
reform depending of the nal self-nanced pension. The next gures show
the expected (at year t) accrual rate at retirement of working the current year
43See Hurd and Rohwedder [2010].
44Berstein et al. [2011].
45The pension system's funds lost in average around 15% of their value. Cen-
tro de Estadisticas de la Superintendencia de Pensiones. Rentabilidad Real de
los Fondos de Pensiones 2008. Superintendencia de Pensiones, Chile. See
http://www.safp.cl/safpstats/stats/ .
70t. Considering that contributions earn returns since they were made until
retirement, an extra worked year at early ages will increase the nal pension
wealth in a higher proportion than those made near to retirement. This
explains why the younger cohorts have higher accrual rates for each year.
The accrual rate diers by gender not only due to the observed dierences in
the wages proles but also due to their dierent participation in the welfare
system's tier.
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Accrual Rate − Reform in 2008
Any variation in either the pension wealth or the accrual rate could ex-
plain the changes in formal labour market participation. Conditional on the
accrual rate, a rise in the expected pension wealth at retirement reduces the
probability to work in the formal sector. On the other hand, a rise in the
accrual rate will increase the opportunity cost of not working in the formal
labour market sector increasing the probability of being formal. I can iden-
tify dierent groups, pre and post reform, with dierent accrual rates. For
example, for those individuals receiving either the PMG or the PASIS, the
implicitly extra pension wealth that they will accumulate for working an ex-
71tra year will be zero.46 After the reform, these workers started to receive the
PBS plus the APS. Then, for any additional worked year, and consequently
for any extra Chilean peso accumulated as pension wealth, workers will re-
ceive at retirement a higher pension which means a positive accrual rate.
The next two gures show, considering the pre and post reform scenario, the
expected (in 2009) pension wealth change at retirement and the expected
accrual rate change at retirement for 4 dierent groups: those workers who
were receiving before the reform the PASIS, those who were receiving the
PMG but will receive a higher pension (HAPS) after the reform, those who
were receiving the PMG but will receive a lower pension (LAPS) after the re-
form and those workers who were completely self-nancing their nal pension
before the reform.













































Change Accurual Rate At Retirement − 2009
The expected (in 2009) accrual rate has changed in average CLP$ -87,169
46There are some workers in the margin that will not receive the PMG (PASIS) at
retirement once they have worked an extra year. The extra accumulated pension wealth
for working one more year allows them self-nance a pension above the PMG (PASIS)
and then the accrual rate will be positive. There are several other cases of workers in
dierent margins, such as those receiving a PASIS and not complying the contributory
requirements for getting a PMG, but once they work an additional year the requirement
is satised and then the PMG is obtained.
72(US$ 191) and CLP$ -51,669 (US$ 114) after the reform for women and
men, respectively. The expected (in 2009) pension wealth increased in CLP$
13,900,000 (US$ 3,058) and CLP$ 7,576,562 (US$ 16,668) after the reform
for women and men, respectively.47 Finally, the average nal eect of the
reform will depend on the relative importance of these groups within the
population, the average change in the pension wealth and the accrual rate
and nally on the marginal eect of the probability to contribute due to these
changes. Next section deals with this last point.
2.4 Results.
This section reports the two stages estimation for the main equation (6).
As I extensively discussed in Subsection 2.1, I estimated a discrete model
for the probability to work in the formal sector using a control function ap-
proach for the expected nal pension wealth variable at retirement. I used
as instruments the interaction between time dummies and group dummies,
where the groups are cohorts and gender. According to the rst stage esti-
mation results, the change of the pension wealth at the time of the reform
varies importantly across both groups, cohorts and gender.48 We can see
clearly a break in the tendency for the cohort and year interacted dummy
coecient after the reform. The coecients for the interacted gender and
year dummies show how the pension wealth has changed largely for women
at the time of the reform. Using the forecasted pension wealth I proceeded to
estimate the second stage. In the next table I show the results for women49
47The average pension wealth and accrual rate changes by age groups and gender are
reported in Section A.5.7 in the Appendix A.
48See the Appendix A, Section A.1, for the rst stage results.
49The results for men are in the Appendix A, Section A.2.
73using dierent specications for a probit discrete model with using either an
instrument variable (IV) approach or a control function (CF) approach. The
rst column includes as covariates the non instrumented (NO IV) pension
wealth and the accrual rate. The accrual rate has, as it is expected, a positive
sign. The higher the accrual rate the larger the incentives for contributing
to the pension system. The pension wealth, contrary to the theory, has a
positive eect. However, once I control for possible endogeneity using both
the IV and CF approaches, I obtain a negative income and a positive sub-
stitution eect. Both eects increase with the age, supporting the idea that
the marginal eect of the reform is larger for those workers near retirement.
74Table 8: Female Formal Labour Market Participation
Women
Variables NO IV  IV  CF
Age  0.0428 0.2019*** 0.0529***
[0.0283] [0.0437] [0.0137]
Age2 -0.0003 -0.0024*** -0.0006***
[0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0002]
Primary (1=Yes) 0.7271*** 1.1774*** 0.5038***
[0.1180] [0.1905] [0.0619]
Secondary(1=Yes) 1.1847*** 2.0768*** 0.9558***
[0.1266] [0.3082] [0.1164]
Degree(1=Yes) 1.5787*** 3.2153*** 1.4974***
[0.1299] [0.5149] [0.2141]
Married -0.4271*** -0.4014*** -0.3575***
[0.0491] [0.0516] [0.0181]
Number Children 0-3 -0.3426*** -0.3713*** -0.2304***
[0.0378] [0.0391] [0.0213]
Number Children 4-5 -0.1843*** -0.2030*** -0.1208***
[0.0380] [0.0386] [0.0249]
Pension Wealth  0.0388*** -0.0281* -0.0281***
[0.0059] [0.0166] [0.0079]
Pension Wealth*Age -0.0004** -0.0005 0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0001]
Accrual Rate 0.0488 0.0269 -0.2676***
[0.0370] [0.0388] [0.0275]
Accrual Rate*Age 0.0020* 0.0039*** 0.0136***
[0.0011] [0.0013] [0.0009]
Constant 1.1888*** 1.3204***
Observations 26,778 26,778 26,778
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Pension Wealth 
variable is intrumented by groups dummies interacted with year dummies. 
Pension Wealth and Accrual Rate  are both measured in Ch$1000000.
Dicrete Choice Model Estimations - Pr. to Contribute=1
As the worker's age seems to be relevant to explain the eect of the
pension wealth and the accrual rate change on the probability to be formal, I
estimate the marginal eects50 including group age dummies interacted with
the pension wealth and the accrual rate, respectively. Using this specication
I capture any non-linear eect of the reform by age. The next gure has
the marginal eect of a CLP$ 1 mill (US$ 2200) accrual rate change on
50Table 24 in the Section A.3 in the Appendix A shows the results for these estimations.
75the probability of being formal for men and women by dierent age groups
(columns 3 and 4, in Section A.3 in the Appendix). The graph shows the
age increasing and gender dependent positive substitution eect. During the
early ages of the life cycle a change of CLP$ 1 mill in the accrual rate rises the
probability to contribute to the pension system in less than 0.3%. However,
this eect is much larger at the end of the cycle when workers are near to
retirement.
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Regarding the pension wealth eect, the next gure shows the marginal
eect of a CLP$ 1 mill expected pension wealth change on the probability
of being formal for men and women by dierent age groups (columns 3 and
4, in Section A.3 in the Appendix). I observe a negative and age increasing
statistically signicant income eect throughout the working life. A rise in
CLP$ 1 mill in the pension wealth reduces the probability to participate
in the formal market, when the employee is near retirement, in more than
0.03%.
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Using dierent values for the future probability to work in the formal
labour market I recompute both the expected pension wealth and the ac-
crual rate and estimate the equation (6) again for each scenario. The results
considering ve dierent probability to contribute scenarios (Pr = j) are
displayed in the table below51.
51Results for men are in the Section A.4 in the Appendix A.
77Table 9: Female Marginal Eects Estimations - Scenarios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Pr=0.1 Pr=0.3 Pr=0.5 Pr=0.7 Pr=0.9
Age  0.1210*** 0.1190*** 0.0047 0.0648*** 0.0246
[0.0181] [0.0191] [0.0246] [0.0238] [0.0243]
Age2 -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0002 -0.0006** -0.0004*
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Married (1=Yes) -0.3523*** 0.4090*** 0.4912*** 0.2752*** 0.3837***
[0.0176] [0.0433] [0.0587] [0.0554] [0.0666]
Number Children 0-3 -0.1713*** 0.7724*** 0.9162*** 0.4505*** 0.7022***
[0.0238] [0.0723] [0.1090] [0.1080] [0.1321]
Number Children 4-5 -0.0818*** 1.1726*** 1.5209*** 0.5043** 1.0688***
[0.0266] [0.1407] [0.2183] [0.2293] [0.3034]
Number Children 6-13 -0.0536*** -0.3484*** -0.3821*** -0.3478*** -0.3728***
[0.0176] [0.0175] [0.0191] [0.0182] [0.0175]
Number Children 14-18 0.0174 -0.1912*** -0.1918*** -0.2417*** -0.1834***
[0.0151] [0.0229] [0.0238] [0.0304] [0.0303]
Pension Wealth* Group Age <25 -0.0412*** -0.0479*** -0.0325*** 0.0239* -0.0167
[0.0083] [0.0081] [0.0109] [0.0134] [0.0181]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 26-30 -0.0221*** -0.0242*** -0.0257** 0.0275** -0.0124
[0.0072] [0.0070] [0.0112] [0.0132] [0.0178]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 31-35 -0.0227*** -0.0207*** -0.0234** 0.0279** -0.0110
[0.0076] [0.0073] [0.0113] [0.0130] [0.0177]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 36-40 -0.0253*** -0.0218*** -0.0264** 0.0303** -0.0137
[0.0079] [0.0076] [0.0114] [0.0131] [0.0177]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 41-45 -0.0204** -0.0197** -0.0304*** 0.0325** -0.0091
[0.0084] [0.0081] [0.0115] [0.0130] [0.0178]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 46-50 -0.0106 -0.0157* -0.0258** 0.0331** -0.0055
[0.0088] [0.0084] [0.0117] [0.0130] [0.0179]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 51-55 -0.0058 -0.0143 -0.0284** 0.0344*** -0.0020
[0.0093] [0.0088] [0.0121] [0.0129] [0.0176]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 56-60 0.0014 -0.0141 -0.0321** 0.0356*** -0.0051
[0.0098] [0.0093] [0.0125] [0.0131] [0.0177]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 61-65 -0.0100 -0.0181* -0.0394*** 0.0206 -0.0114
[0.0110] [0.0102] [0.0133] [0.0144] [0.0183]
Accrual Rate* Group Age <25 0.6258*** 0.6572*** 0.0060 0.0066 0.1092***
[0.0362] [0.0379] [0.0271] [0.0296] [0.0363]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 26-30 0.4062*** 0.3512*** 0.0666*** 0.0912*** 0.1800***
[0.0220] [0.0198] [0.0095] [0.0248] [0.0379]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 31-35 0.5239*** 0.3366*** 0.1287*** 0.1400*** 0.2672***
[0.0306] [0.0219] [0.0151] [0.0365] [0.0566]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 36-40 0.7971*** 0.4989*** 0.2812*** 0.0800** 0.4800***
[0.0401] [0.0290] [0.0289] [0.0328] [0.0733]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 41-45 0.7977*** 0.4783*** 0.4933*** 0.1002*** 0.2580***
[0.0520] [0.0373] [0.0425] [0.0304] [0.0679]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 46-50 0.6833*** 0.5396*** 0.3534*** 0.1560*** 0.4999***
[0.0643] [0.0488] [0.0452] [0.0510] [0.0705]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 51-55 0.6787*** 0.8170*** 0.6956*** 0.1370*** 0.5235***
[0.0749] [0.0798] [0.0714] [0.0530] [0.0809]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 56-60 0.6691*** 1.3440*** 1.5403*** 0.2394** 1.2746***
[0.1061] [0.1389] [0.1617] [0.1021] [0.1866]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 61-65 0.9201*** 0.7747*** 1.0900*** -0.1344 0.4328
[0.2285] [0.2325] [0.2319] [0.5243] [0.3849]
Residual 0.0724*** 0.0721*** 0.0693*** -0.0027 0.0346*
[0.0079] [0.0077] [0.0116] [0.0145] [0.0188]
Marginal Effects Probit Dicrete Choice Model Estimations - Women - Probability to Contribute=1
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, dummies.  Pension Wealth and Accrual Rate  are 
measured  both in Ch$1000000. Dummies years and cohorts included.
78This exercise shows that both the accrual rate and the pension wealth
coecient are still statistically signicant for most of the scenarios assumed.
Regarding the accrual rate coecient, its magnitude turns lower as the proba-
bility to contribute to the system increases from 0.1, reversing as a U shaped
when the probability to contribute converge to 1. As the reform reduces
in average the accrual rate, Section 2.3, there is a nal negative eect on
the probability to contribute due to the substitution eect. On the other
hand, the nal eect on the probability of working formally due to the larger
pension wealth is negative, being no signicant for the higher probabilities
scenarios. Both eects complement each other reducing in average the prob-
ability to contribute in the pension system by 5.2% and 3.4% for women and
men52, respectively.
2.4.1 Pension Wealth Changes.
2.4.1.1 Changes in the accumulated pension wealth before and
after the reform. In Figure 15, I show some evidence on the changes
in the self-nanced pension wealth accumulated in the individual accounts
before and after the reform. Any observed change after the reform will be due
to the new mechanism and subsidies other than the changes to the rst tier.
The graphs display the frequency distribution for the self-nanced pension
wealth for women belonging to the 1940 and 1960 cohorts. Taking into
account that older workers, at the moment of the reform, do not have many
years to take advantage of the subsidies, such as the return for every born
52The nal average eect is computed, rst, forecasting the individual probability to
contribute according to the pre and post reform scenarios, which allows me to compute
the individual percentage change in the probability to contribute due to the reform, and
then averaging the individual eects.
79child or the disability insurance compensation, the change for older cohorts
should be smaller than the one for younger cohorts.53
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The average predicted self-nanced pension wealth change for employees
born in the 60s is CLP$ 1,020,413 (US$ 2,244) which is almost 8 times larger
than the change for the ones born in the 40s and represents an average
increment of 4% of the PW before reform.
2.4.1.2 Changes in the frequency of pensions resulting from the
reform. I have showed that the subsidies introduced by the reform changed
the accumulated resources and through it the self-nanced pension. Addi-
tionally, conditional to a particular self-nanced pension wealth, the changes
introduced to the rst tier of the system modied the nal pension distri-
bution. These changes are dierent for dierent population groups. For
instance, as some elements of the reform are just aecting younger workers,
the change in nal pension will be probably larger for this group. In the two
53Section A.5.3 in the Appendix A has gures with the frequency of the self-nanced
pension wealth by educational levels.
80panels of Figure 16, I plot the frequency distribution of pension amounts,
measured in CLP$1,000 (US$ 2,2), before and after the reform, for female54
workers belonging to the cohorts born in the 40s and the 60s. The rst group
is composed by workers who are retiring between 2005 and 2015.55 This is
the rst group of employees retiring under the post reform system. The
1960 cohort, composed by employees who will retire around 2025-2035, is
the rst group that will retire having contributed all their working life in the
DC system. We observe that for both groups the nal pension will increase
importantly after the reform. The average monthly female pension change
is CLP$ 29,748 (US$ 65) for those workers belonging to 1940 cohort and
CLP$ 69,231 (US$ 152) for those belonging to 1960 cohort, representing an
increment of 25% and 69% of the nal pension before reform, respectively.
The most impressive change, however, is the shift in the distribution. The
left tail of both distributions is substantially reduced and the middle of the
distribution is increased. In Section 2.4.2 below I show how these shifts are
reected in changes in dierent measures of inequality.
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54The same graphs for men are in the Appendix A, Section A.5.1
55I am just considering those who have not retired in 2009 yet.
81As long as the rst tier reform aects particularly workers with low self-
nanced pensions, because they will qualify for the new welfare pension sub-
sidies (APS), the change in the nal pension should be larger for them. In
the two panels of Figure 17, I graph pension distribution for workers with-
out formal education or incomplete primary school, and for those who got
a college degree, respectively.56 Although the reform shifts the distribution
for both groups, it is clearly much more important for the group with lower
education, who are much more directly aected by the changes in the rst
tier. While the graph refers to the 1940 cohort, a similar story holds for other
cohorts57.



























20 40 60 80 100
Ch$ 1000
After Reform Before Reform





















0 200 400 600
Ch$ 1000
After Reform Before Reform
Pension Distribution −  College. Women Cohort 1940
2.4.1.3 Changes in the frequency of the gender pension dierence.
As some of the subsidies were specically target to women, we can expect
larger shifts for the frequency of female nal pensions than for that of men
56The frequency of pensions for workers with primary and secondary level of education
are in the Appendix A, Section A.5.1.
57See the Section A.5.1 in the Appendix A.
82pensions. This hypothesis is strongly supported comparing the two panels of
Figure 18, that plot, for the 1940 cohort, the frequency of pensions before and
after the reform for men and women. Although the nal pensions increase in
both cases, the change in the distribution is much larger for female pensions,
reducing substantially the gap between them. The gender pension dierence
for workers belonging to the 1940 cohort is CLP$ 23,254 (US$ 51) and CLP$
14,073 (US$ 9) before and after the reform, respectively. Graphs for the 1960
cohort are in the Appendix A, Section A.5.2. The gender pension dierence
for workers belonging to the 1960 cohort is CLP$ 81,120 (US$ 178) and
CLP$57,379 (US$ 126) before and after the reform, respectively.
























































Pension After Reform − Cohort 1940
The two panels of Figure 19, show the estimated frequency distribution
for the pension changes induced by the reform, considering two dierent co-
horts. In Section A.5.2 of the Appendix A, I report gures with the frequency
distribution for pension changes by educational level. The nal pension in-
creases importantly for both cohorts. However, the increase is clearly larger
for those workers belonging to the 1960 cohort. In both cases the increase in
female pensions is larger than that for males, closing gender inequalities. The
83average change for the female pension is CLP$ 77,977 (US$ 172), which is
70% larger than the average male change. The average male pension change
is CLP$ 15,148 (US$ 11) and CLP$ 35,263 (US$ 78) for those workers be-
longing to the 1940 and 1960 cohort, respectively.
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2.4.2 Inequality and Poverty Changes.
2.4.2.1 Changes in pensions and pension wealth inequality. Hav-
ing looked at changes in the distribution of pension and pension wealth, I
now focus on specic measures of inequality that complement the graphical
analysis I have provided so far. In particular, for both nal pension and
pension wealth, and for both men and women, I report the level of the Gini
coecient, the standard deviation of logs as well as ratios of dierent quan-
tiles of the distribution. I start, in Tables 10 and 11, with some gures for
the distribution of accumulated pension wealth. As I mentioned before, this
does not take into account the rst tier and the redistributive role that it
plays and focuses only on the predicted amount in the individual accounts
84upon retirement. In each table, I report two panels, one for women and one
for men and, in each panel, gures for dierent cohorts and for the total.
A simple look at Table 10 and 11 conrms what was already evident from
the analysis of the distribution graphs: the changes in the means in Figure 10
hide much more complex changes in the distribution. The general picture is
that, even neglecting the eect of Tier 1 and the redistributive role it plays,
the reform reduces the amount of inequality in accumulated pension wealth
for women. The overall Gini coecient for women is reduced from 0.53 to
0.49. The standard deviation of logs from 1.21 to 1.04. The reduction in
inequality is particularly marked for the youngest cohorts.
For men, instead, there are virtually no changes in inequality in accu-
mulated pension wealth. These results are explained by the fact that the
changes in accumulated wealth induced by the reform are mainly driven by
the child subsidies, the divorce regulations and the other elements I discussed.
It is remarkable that they not only reduce the inequality between men and
women but also inequality among women.
The general story that emerges from Table 10 is conrmed in Table 11,
where I report the ratios of dierent percentiles. Once again, only the ratios
of women change with the reform. I notice that the largest reductions seem
to occur in the left tail of the distribution. For instance, for the whole sample
of women, the ratio between the 90th and 50th percentile goes from 1.39 to
1.24, while the ratio between the 50th and 10th percentile goes from 1.73 to
1.41. Once again the largest reductions in inequality occurs for the youngest
cohorts.
85Table 10: Pension Wealth Inequality Measures
Women
Cohort 1940 1.94 1.72 0.60 0.60
Cohort 1950 1.47 1.28 0.62 0.59
Cohort 1960 1.19 1.01 0.56 0.51
Cohort 1970 1.05 0.85 0.49 0.43
Cohort 1980 0.86 0.76 0.43 0.38
Total 1.21 1.04 0.53 0.49
Men 
Cohort 1940 1.20 1.20 0.53 0.53
Cohort 1950 1.11 1.11 0.50 0.50
Cohort 1960 0.98 0.98 0.46 0.46
Cohort 1970 0.82 0.82 0.40 0.40
Cohort 1980 0.71 0.71 0.36 0.36
Total 0.95 0.95 0.44 0.44
Pension Wealth is the total accumulated saving into the individuals accounts.
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Table 11: Pension Wealth Inequality Measures
Women
Cohort 1940 5.28 4.60 1.90 1.87 2.91 2.78 3.38 2.72
Cohort 1950 3.90 3.38 1.82 1.74 2.12 1.82 2.08 1.64
Cohort 1960 3.17 2.66 1.58 1.42 1.81 1.45 1.59 1.24
Cohort 1970 2.77 2.20 1.21 1.07 1.52 1.18 1.56 1.13
Cohort 1980 2.32 1.91 1.01 0.90 1.18 0.97 1.32 1.01
Total 3.12 2.65 1.39 1.24 1.73 1.44 1.73 1.41
Men 
Cohort 1940 3.12 3.12 1.41 1.41 1.23 1.23 1.71 1.71
Cohort 1950 2.83 2.84 1.24 1.24 1.31 1.31 1.60 1.60
Cohort 1960 2.55 2.55 1.08 1.09 1.26 1.25 1.46 1.46
Cohort 1970 2.09 2.10 0.90 0.90 1.06 1.06 1.20 1.20
Cohort 1980 1.81 1.82 0.80 0.80 0.94 0.94 1.01 1.01
Total 2.38 2.38 1.01 1.01 1.19 1.20 1.37 1.37
Pension Wealth is the total  accumulated savings into the individuals accounts.

















In Tables 12 and 13, I report the inequality measures and ratio of per-
centiles for predicted pensions. As mention above, the main reason these
tables dier from Tables 10 and 11 is that they reect the redistributive role
86played by the rst tier and the social pensions, before and after the reform.
First, as to be expected, the inequality measures in Table 12 are considerably
lower than those in Table 10. Moreover, the reduction is more pronounced
after the reform than before. For instance, if I compare the Gini coecient
for women in Table 10 and Table 12 it goes from 0.53 for pension wealth to
0.49 for pension entitlements before the reform. The same gures after the
reform are 0.49 and 0.38: the rst tier after the reform implies an 11 point
reduction in the Gini coecient when going from pension wealth to pension.
Before the reform the same reduction was only 4 points.
The second thing to notice is that, while in Tables 10 and 11 there are
no eects on men, now the more aggressive (and more expensive) rst tier
implies a reduction in inequality for men as well as women. For instance, the
overall Gini for men goes from 0.42 to 0.36, while that for women is reduced
from 0.49 to 0.38.
The nal element to notice, is that in Table 13, the changes in the left
tail of the distribution of pensions are somewhat surprising. In particular,
I notice that the ratio between the 50th and 10th percentile distribution of
pensions for some cohort increases (rather than decrease) for some cohorts,
especially the younger cohort of women. This somewhat surprising result
is probably explained by the complexity of the reform and by the fact that
the 10th percentile of pension values increases moderately after the reform
while the 50th percentile pension value increase greatly, explaining most of
the change.
87Table 12: Pension Inequality Measures
Women
Cohort 1940 1.83 1.50 0.57 0.50
Cohort 1950 1.40 1.18 0.59 0.48
Cohort 1960 1.09 0.91 0.52 0.37
Cohort 1970 0.94 0.78 0.45 0.32
Cohort 1980 0.75 0.76 0.39 0.31
Total 1.11 0.95 0.49 0.38
Men 
Cohort 1940 1.12 1.07 0.51 0.48
Cohort 1950 1.02 0.90 0.48 0.42
Cohort 1960 0.89 0.79 0.44 0.36
Cohort 1970 0.78 0.71 0.39 0.33
Cohort 1980 0.67 0.65 0.34 0.30
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Table 13: Pension Inequality Measures
Women
Cohort 1940 5.15 3.97 1.81 1.24 2.40 1.51 3.34 2.73
Cohort 1950 3.67 3.00 1.55 0.89 1.84 1.43 2.12 2.11
Cohort 1960 2.96 2.31 1.35 0.63 1.55 1.05 1.62 1.67
Cohort 1970 2.47 1.88 1.19 0.52 1.18 0.93 1.29 1.36
Cohort 1980 1.97 1.84 0.99 0.42 0.88 0.99 0.98 1.42
Total 2.87 2.30 1.25 0.70 1.43 1.13 1.62 1.60
Men 
Cohort 1940 2.87 2.69 1.28 1.21 1.16 1.06 1.60 1.49
Cohort 1950 2.51 2.13 1.21 1.02 1.28 0.82 1.30 1.12
Cohort 1960 2.23 1.93 1.03 0.79 1.22 0.72 1.19 1.14
Cohort 1970 1.91 1.76 0.89 0.64 0.99 0.72 1.02 1.12
Cohort 1980 1.70 1.61 0.77 0.55 0.84 0.74 0.93 1.05
Total 2.14 1.92 0.96 0.77 1.13 0.86 1.18 1.15
P50/P10
AR















2.4.2.2 Changes in poverty levels before and after the reform for
elderly people, in particular, for elderly women. Between 1990 to
882006 the fraction of the Chilean population below the poverty line decreased
gradually from 39% to 14%. This reduction has also been important among
the elderly population, changing from 21% to 8%, for those older than 60
years old.58 One of the objectives of the reform was the reduction of the
prevalence of poverty among pensioners. Therefore another interesting as-
pects of the distribution of pensions before and after the reform I might want
to consider is the prevalence of poverty at retirement.
The two panels of Figure 20 and 21 show, for dierent groups, the cu-
mulative distribution of expected pensions at retirement before and after the
reform. Using the poverty line set by the government at CLP$64,000 (US$
141) in 200959, I show the fraction of retirees who, are below the poverty
line, assuming that they do not have any other income source. The poverty
levels usually reported by the Chilean Government are computed considering
per-capita household income, which includes all household earnings, pensions
and all dierent types of governmental transfers and subsidies. In what fol-
lows I only look at individual pensions. The results are therefore not directly
comparable with the Government poverty statistics. However, the point that
I want to make here is to show how the reform changes the left tail of the
distribution of pensions. I choose as the cut o point at which I look the
level that denes poverty in the absence of other incomes.
58Serie Analisis de Resultados de la Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socioeconomica Na-
cional (CASEN 2006). Ministerio de Planicacion, Chile.
59CASEN 2009. I assume a rate of growth for the poverty line of 3%, in line with
expected ination. Although the growth in the poverty line between 2006 and 2009 was
19%, it stayed around the same real value before 2009.
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The reform reduces the fraction of women with a pension below the
poverty line by 32% (from 53% to 21%) and 36% (from 56% to 20%) for
the 1940 and 1960 cohort, respectively. This eect diers by educational
level and is particularly relevant for low education groups. For example, for
women without complete primary education, the prevalence of (expected)
pensions below the poverty line goes from over 90% to just over 40%.
Finally, it is important to note that, by changing the present discounted
value of future benets and how participation into the labour market aects
future pension rights, the reform will change current and future labour sup-
90ply as well as the participation into the formal labour market. So far, I have
focused on the immediate impact of the reform on pension wealth and in-
equality, however it is expected that the new incentives will change labour
market participation. From a theoretical point of view, the reform has an
ambiguous eect on participation to the formal labour market. Most individ-
uals will experience both income and substitution eects as a consequence of
the reform. The former will typically decrease the propensity to participate
to the formal labour market, while the latter can go both ways, depending
on whether, for a specic individual, the rate of conversion of participation
into future pension benets (the accrual rate) increases or decreases, that is
where in Figure 1 each individual is located. I have found that, empirically,
income and substitution eects work in a way consistent with the theory.
When aggregating the dierent impacts, I nd that the overall eect on the
probability to contribute to pension system is negative as a result of the
reform, reducing the participation in the formal labour market by around
4.1% for those workers older than 40 years old. The results dier by gender
and age. The reform reduces the probability of being formal by 3.2% and
2.8% for women and men between 56 and 65 years old, respectively. As the
reform has reduced the probability to contribute to the pension system we
can expect a lower increment in the nal pension due to the reform. The
next section shows detailed how the probability to contribute to the pension
system has been aected by the reform.
912.4.3 Labour Market Participation Changes.
2.4.3.1 Changes in the probability to contribute and changes in
the frequency of contributions. In this section I use the main equation
results for forecasting the probability to contribute in any future period un-
der the pre and post reform scenarios, respectively. With these predictions
in hand I estimated the fraction of women contributing to pension system
before and after the reform. The next two gures show the frequency for the
forecasted probability to contribute60 to the pension system in 2012 under
the pre and post reform system's rule. As I discussed in the Section 2.1, the
nal result depends on the relative importance of the income and substitu-
tion eect. Considering that in average the accrual rate decreases and the
pension wealth increases after the reform, both eect complement each other
reducing the probability of being formal. The probability to contribute in
2012 decreases in average by 3% and 5% for women belonging to 1940 and
1960 cohort, respectively.












.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Pr(cont_prof)
Before Reform After Reform
Year 2012












.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Pr(cont_prof)
Before Reform After Reform
Year 2012
Forecasted Probability to Contribute. Women Cohort 1960
Using these forecasted probabilities I compute how the frequency of con-
60The results for cohorts born in 1950 and 1970 are in the Appendix A, Section A.5.5.
92tributions, dened as the total contributed periods over the total poten-
tially working periods, will change with the conditions introduced by the
reform. The next two gures show the estimated frequency of contributions
for women and men. The reform aects negatively the frequency of contri-
butions for both gender, being the negative eect larger for women than for
men. The frequency of contributions decreases in average by 2.8% for women
and 1.5% for men.
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Using the predicted probabilities to contribute I impute to each future
individual-period a contributed period if a randomly generated number falls
within the predictions. Then, I compute the fraction of individuals, over the
economically active people and employees61, contributing each period under
the pre and post reform conditions. Under both measures the reform reduces
the coverage of the pension system being the eects larger for the last part
of the working life cycle. The fraction of women and men working formally
decreases in average by 4.3% and 1.7%, respectively, when the computation
61Regarding the participation over the total employees, as I do not observe future labour
market participation I proceed to impute it using the estimated system in the Section
2.2.1. This allows me to dene those individual-period observations where individuals are
working.
93is done over the economically active people and 2.1% and 1.1% when it is
done over the employees.
2.4.3.2 Changes in male and female formal labour market partic-
ipation. Many elements of the reform were explicitly designed to improve
nal female pensions, reducing in this way the observed gender pension gap.
The child subsidy is an attempt to recognize the non contributed periods due
to childbearing, the disability insurance compensation recognizes the gender
health risk dierence and the compensation upon divorce recognizes the share
of the household load as a couple. The female accumulated resources have
been historically lower than the male ones. This path could be explained not
only due to the lower wages proles but also due to the much lower female
labour market participation. In this sense, any decrease in the probability to
contribute will compensate, through the associated PW reduction, the initial
improvement due to the reform's elements mentioned above. The next gures
display the frequency for the change in formal labour market participation
by gender.
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94As was expected, the shift for the female pension frequency is larger than
the one observed for men. Those men self-nancing a pension larger than the
PMAS will not be aected by the rst tier reform. Therefore, the incentives
to participate in the formal labour market will not change as the expected
nal pension wealth and the accrual rate remain the same.
2.4.3.3 Eects of having a child on the labour market participa-
tion before and after the reform. In this subsection I simulate the eect
of having an extra child on the probability to contribute to the pension sys-
tem under the pre and post reform conditions. The next gures show the
change in the probability to contribute in year 2010. I am assuming that ev-
ery worker between 20 and 40 years old have an additional child during this
year. As the main equation estimations show, an additional child reduces
the female probability to work in the formal sector. Both gures below, for
cohort 1970 and 1980, conrm this statement and show that after the reform
the fall in the probability to contribute is even larger. An additional child
after the reform implies, through the new child subsidy, an income eect at
retirement. Therefore, I can explain the larger post reform reduction of the
probability to contribute as a result of this income eect. The average female
decrease of the probability to contribute at the year of child birth is around
0.03% for women younger than 40 years old.
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2.5 Final Considerations.
In this section I have measured the direct eects of the reform on the nal
pension distribution and estimate the eects of the reform on formal labour
market participation. The reform's eligibility conditions, such as being poor,
young or female, has allowed me to dene groups for whom the change in
the currently expected pension wealth at retirement due to the reform dif-
fers. I therefore exploited the dierential eects of the reform on individuals
belonging to several year-of-birth cohorts and dierent groups to gain iden-
tication. In doing so, I computed the expected pension wealth at time t for
each individual upon retirement. As the nal pension wealth depends on the
number of contributions, the amount contributed and all subsides obtained
during the working life, I estimate the future patterns of contributions to the
pension systems, wage proles and all the socio-economics characteristics
which dene the eligibility for the dierent subsidies.
The obtained results in this section allows to extent potential and par-
96tial labour market eects for either future new modications to the pension
system or future improvements to the dierent mechanisms and subsidies
already implemented. In this sense, the marginal income and substitution
eect computed in this section becomes a useful tool to guide ex-ante eval-
uations for any future system reform. The 2008 reform aimed not only to
guarantee a minimum level of consumption upon retirement, prevent old-age
poverty and reduce gender inequalities but also to encourage participation
in the formal labour market. As I have seen through the section, the reform
has increased importantly the pension wealth, specially for women, accom-
plishing the rst set of goals. However, at the same time it has reduced
the incentives to participate in the formal labour market. The main reason
argued here has been a trade-o, in terms of pension wealth improvements
and formal labour market participation, that the new subsidies and welfare
pensions have raised. The larger pensions due to the reform have slightly
reduced the incentives to work formally, through a direct negative income
eect and an indirect substitution eect explained by the changes in the ac-
crual rate. This trade-o rises the point about the optimal subsidies and
welfare pensions.
The main results of this section can be summarized in the following way.
Firstly, the changes in the nal pension wealth at retirement and the accrual
rate have reduced formal labour market participation. The probability to
contribute to pension system has decreased as a result of the reform, reduc-
ing the participation in the formal labour market by around 4.1% for those
workers older than 40 years old. The results dier by gender and age. The
reform reduces the probability of being formal by 3.2% and 2.8% for women
97and men between 56 and 65 years old, respectively. Secondly, the reform
has increased not only the self-nanced pension wealth, due to the dier-
ent mechanisms or subsidies received during the accumulation period, but
also has importantly improved the nal pension due to the rst tier reform.
For those workers retiring before 2015, the self-nanced pension wealth and
the nal pension will increase in average by 0.6% and 15%, respectively.
Even though the nal pension changes have been positive for both gender,
the female pension improvement has been 56% higher than the rise for men
reducing importantly the gender inequalities.
This section is not without limitations and the results should be taken
with some caution. Predicting future earnings and family histories is intrinsi-
cally dicult, although the use of individual histories, gained from adminis-
trative data makes me condent of the relevance of my predictions. Probably
the main limitation is that I do not incorporate in my predictions of earnings
and contributory behavior any changes that might be caused by the reform.
In this sense, this section should be interpreted as a rst order approximation
of future pensions and labour supply changes induced by the reform, as it
does not incorporate behavioral changes. In order to capture all behavioral
changes due to the reform a fully structural model should be used. Next
section deals with this point.
983 A Structural Household Life Cycle Model
of Consumption Labour Supply and Pen-
sion Saving
In order to estimate the eects of the new pension incentives on for-
mal labour market participation, considering all behavioral eects due to
the reform, this section solves a dynamic partial equilibrium structural life
cycle model of consumption, labour supply and pension savings (Berkovec
and Stern [1991], Rust and Phelan [1997], Gustman and Steinmeier [2004],
Klaauw and Wolpin [2008], Joubert and Todd [2011], French and Jones
[2011]). A two-earners' household optimally choose each period individuals'
consumption and labour supply. Individuals can work either in the formal
or in the informal sector or not work at all.
The main contributions of this section are twofold. Firstly, it solves and
estimates a dynamic consumption, labour supply and pension savings accu-
mulation life cycle structural model. It complements the existing literature
by incorporating the choice of two sectors in the labour market, the formal
and informal labour sectors (Klaauw and Wolpin [2008], Joubert and Todd
[2011]) and by allowing for intrahousehold bargaining power (Voena [2011]).
Households choose individuals' sector labour supply and consumption in an
environment with uncertainty given by sectoral wage shocks, future marital
status and future fertility choices. The model enables workers to borrow
against non-pension savings, considering current and future intrahousehold
allocation in consumption and labour supply and future possibilities to di-
99vorce, marriage and the birth of more children. Gender bargaining power
within the household determines the intrahousehold sharing rule. In par-
ticular, the larger the male bargaining power, the lower the female welfare
improvement is due to a pension wealth increase. As total pension income
is consumed by each household's member according to the sharing rule, any
female pension improvement increases her husband's resources. Therefore,
gender welfare changes due to the reform depend on gender bargaining power.
I estimate structurally the gender bargaining power change exploiting the
fact that the reform exogenously changes the original income female situa-
tion within the household.
Secondly, I compare the results with the evaluation made in Section 2,
which, as I described before, estimates the impact of the reform using a con-
trol function approach. This methodology exploits the fact that the reform
dierently aects dierent groups of the population, such as individuals be-
longing to dierent age cohorts and gender. In the past section I compute the
mechanical distributional eects of the reform, considering both the rst-tier
reform and the various contributory tier elements introduced. Importantly,
I show that the reform has reduced the inequalities observed in the system,
closing the historical gender gap, increased average nal pensions and re-
duced the probability of contributing to the system. This methodology par-
tially captures some behavioral eects, estimating how the current labour
market choices change due to the reform. However, it does not incorporate
the eect of those new current labour market choices, and eventually future
labour choices, on future pensions at retirement. I does not consider how the
reform could aect the complete lifetime path of labour market choices and
100consequently the long-term impact of the reform. Without a fully structural
model that includes forward-looking behavior, it is not possible to control for
this endogenous process between pensions at retirement and the complete life
cycle path of labour choices. Comparing the reduced-form empirical strategy
with the structural model enables one to understand and compute the bias
obtained when forward-looking behavior is not considered and to highlight
the relevance of considering fully structural models to evaluate major public
policies (Todd and Wolpin [2006], Attanasio et al. [2012b]). The estimates
from the reduced-form methodology are somewhat dierent; for workers over
60, the reform is estimated to have a 0.2% larger eect on formal labour
market participation, whereas for younger workers between 41 and 45 years
old, the estimate is 3% smaller. The main reason to explain this it is that the
trade-o, in terms of pension wealth improvements and formal labour market
participation, that the new subsidies and welfare pensions have raised is not
considered by the reduced-form strategy. The larger pensions due to the re-
form have reduced the incentives to work formally through a direct negative
income eect, which is not oset by the positive substitution eect given by
the changes in the accrual rate. This trade-o raises, as I mentioned before,
a point about the optimal subsidies and welfare pensions in designing the
optimal incentives to increase participation in the pension systems, reducing
scal burden, and guaranteeing minimum levels of consumption for retirees.
Joubert and Todd [2011] estimate a structural model to evaluate the im-
pact of the 2008 Chilean pension reform. Unlike this section they model the
household's consumption choices splitting non-saved income between both
household's members evenly. They assume symmetric bargaining power
101within the household and do not allow for borrowing against non-pension
income. On the other hand, they assume that the worse-o member upon
divorce gets the maximum of either their own pension or one-half of the
pooled household pension savings and they do not include the changes in the
survivor benet introduced by the reform. Their results go in the same direc-
tion than the previous studies and mine, formal labour market participation
approximately decreases by 10% and 19% for women and men between 60
and 65 years old, respectively.
The main results of this section are as follows: First, the reform has in-
creased not only the self-nanced pension wealth, due to the dierent mech-
anisms or subsidies received during the accumulation period, but also has
importantly improved the nal pension due to the rst-tier reform. For those
workers retiring before 2015, the self-nanced pension wealth and the nal
pension on average see increases of 0.3% and 22%, respectively. Secondly,
the new incentives introduced by the reform have reduced formal labour
market participation. The probability to contribute to the pension system
has decreased as a result of the reform, reducing participation in the for-
mal labour market by around 4.2% for those workers older than 40 years
old. The results are signicantly higher for women. The reform reduces the
probability of being formal by 2.7% and 2.3% for women and men between
61 and 65 years old, respectively. Thirdly, even though the nal pension
changes have been positive for both gender, the female pension improvement
has been 32% higher than the rise for men reducing importantly the gender
inequalities. The rst tier after the reform implies a 17-point reduction in
the Gini coecient. Before the reform, the same reduction was only 6 points.
102The estimated bargaining power coecient using pre-reform data is equal to
0.64, meaning that the male bargaining power within the household is almost
double that of females. When estimations are done using post-reform data,
the estimated bargaining power decreases to 0.61, showing that the reform
has increased female bargaining power by about 0.3 points.
3.1 Model
I solve a partial equilibrium life-cycle model with two-earners' households
choosing optimally consumption, labour supply, and pension savings for each
period.62 I model both single households composed of either a man or a
woman and two-earners' households, which are composed of a husband and
a wife. Households maximize each period of their lifetime expected utility,
choosing each individual's work status and consumption level. Individual
consumption C
j
t and labour market choices h
j
t = fNW;I;Fg are chosen
according to spouses' bargaining power, where j 2 fm;fg indicates the male
and female partner within the household, respectively. Individuals can work
in the informal (I) sector (h
j
t = I), work in the formal (F) sector (h
j
t = F)
and not work (NW) at all (h
j
t = NW). The two-earners' household model
provides understanding of the mechanisms used by couples to make choices
within the household. Estimating a single-earner model when the household
is composed of a couple will bias the estimated self-insurance mechanism
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Consideration of the family
labour supply allows one to include extra mechanisms to smooth consumption
beyond those usually considered in the one-earner consumption and labour
62As in the previous section I use a year as the main unit of time. This assumption
reduces considerably the computing time necessary to solve the model.
103supply models, such as reoptimizing spending and using credit markets in
response to shocks. Negative labour shocks for one of the family members
can be crowded out with the other family earner labour supply reaction.63
Modeling households with one individual when family is present rules out a
couple's leisure complementarity or substitutability, assuming that spouses'
consumption and labour choices do not depend on the other partner's choices.
Therefore, the potential unitary model's bias depends among other things
on the couple's choices' complementarity or substitutability.64 On the other
hand, modeling household labour choices in a two-earners frame allows one
to control for household precautionary labour supply when the total family
income uncertainty increases, pooling the income risk within the household.
I assume that workers can save and borrow in the nancial market according
to a constant interest rate (1+r). Individuals can borrow a fraction of their
present value lifetime total earnings. Workers can contribute each period into
their individual pensions accounts according to an exogenous contribution
rate.65
Two-earners' households maximize the following expected lifetime utility
function
63I am modeling just the extensive margin for the labour supply. Including hours of work
could give even more information about the role of the labour supply as a consumption-
smoothing mechanism (Blundell et al. [2012]). Modeling the intensive margin of the labour
supply is a natural extension of this model.
64Gustman and Steinmeier [2004] and Casanova [2011] show that spouses' leisure choices
are complement near retirement.
65Individuals can save annually voluntary additional amounts, with a cap of US$14400,















































Where T is the exogenous age of retirement66, 0 <  < 1 is the dis-
count factor. Each member's consumption is valued according to the Pareto
weight , which can be understood as a bargaining parameter (Chiappori
and Browning [1998], Chiappori [1992] and Blundell et al. [2005]) within the
household. Two-earners' households get instant utility from each earner's
consumption and disutility for each earner's positive labour supply choice
according to a non-separable and non-homothetic CRRA utility function
(Browing and Meghir [1991]) as shown below. Ignoring the non-separability
between leisure and consumption could bias the consumption response to per-
manent wage shocks. The sign of the bias will depend on the substitutability




















66The legal age of retirement is 65 for men and 60 for women. However, workers can
continue working and contributing after this age. I assume that both retire at 65 as the










The CRRA function enables me to model risk-averse individuals according
to the risk aversion coecient  > 1. Individuals self-insure against expected
future negative shocks through precautionary saving and labour supply. I as-
sume that the labour supply disutility cost is sector- and gender-dependent
dependent through the coecients  
j




3 and  
j
4. The formal sector
labour market is on average associated with less time exibility but at the
same time with lower uncertainty. Therefore, conditional on the same wages,
individuals with dierent preferences about these features will self-select in
each sector.67 Working formally or informally generates a consumption in-
dependent disutility cost represented by  
j
3 > 0 and  
j
4 > 0, respectively.
Marginal consumption utility diers whether individuals do not work or ei-
ther work formally or informally trough coecients  
j
1 and  
j
2. { is an indica-
tor function, which takes the value of one if the term inside the bracket is true.
Workers retire at T = 65 years old and nance their pensions from the total
accumulated funds. Total utility upon retirement is given by the terminal in-
direct utility function, VT+1, which depends on each after-retirement-period
earner's consumption, nanced by the total family assets saved during the














Households consume during each period upon retirement a constant frac-
67I do not model unobserved heterogeneity in the preferences.
106tion of the total saved assets at retirement and the total current period
withdrawn pensions. Consumption is done according to the number of pe-
riods during which retiree will receive the pension, LE68, and the earner's
bargaining power within the household, . I assume that all individuals at
retirement choose a phased withdrawal pension modality.
Households maximize their problem subject to the assets and pension
wealth inter-temporal budget constraints. The former is given by





















t = Ig + nwt) ; AT+1  0
Where At+1 is the total household accumulated nancial assets at period
t+1 ,  is the 10% tax-deferred exogenous contribution rate that individuals





are the real pos-tax wages received by earner j in the formal and informal
sector, respectively, and nwt is the household non-labour income such as
other welfare subsidies. Non-pension savings earn deterministic returns 1 +
r, which are assumed to be equal to 5%. Workers choose then between
taxable and liquid assets At and tax-deferred and completely illiquid pension
saving assets. Compulsory pension savings could crowd out private savings
68It is dened according to the average Chilean life expectancy. I take into account the
life expectancy by gender, 86 for women and 82 for men.
107depending of the relative importance of precautionary savings (Gale and
Scholz [19944] and Engen et al. [1996]). I assume that workers consume all









r ), where D is the age of death assumed with
certainty. Therefore, bequests are involuntary, and therefore they do not
leave any utility. Total assets at retirement must be non-negative AT+1  0.
The maximum amount that each household can borrow at period t is a
fraction  of the present value of the total future earners' minimum sectoral
wages. Thus, maximum household consumption at period t is upper bounded


















t  Bt + At
Individual total pension wealth at retirement depends on each individual's
annual contributions made during the working life, the earned returns due
to the nancial investment choices made by the PFA69, the recognition bond
RBt captures any past contributions made in the old PAYG system and the
dierent mechanism introduced by the reform, named WE, such as the child
subsidy, the compensation upon divorce and the male survivor pension and
69Dierent according to the multifunds chosen or the compulsory allocated fund by
default.
108disability insurance new premium. The pension savings intertemporal budget










s = Fg(1 + rpw)
t s + RBt + WE(child;marr;sex)
The reform changes the expected accumulated pension wealth through the
dierent incentives attempting to increase contributions to the system. Those
new mechanisms depend on gender (sex), such as the new male survivor
pension and the new disability insurance premium, on the number of children
(child), such as the new child subsidy given to every mother, and on the
marital status (marr), such as the divorce compensation given to the worse-
o member upon divorce. The reform not only changes nal pensions at
retirement through the self-nanced pension wealth at retirement PW
j
T which
is dened following the previous equation, but also through the new welfare
rst tier containing the non-contributory pension PBS and the contributory
subsidy APS. Therefore, the nal pension wealth diers from the self-nanced
pension wealth, because the latter only considers the accumulated funds in
the individual account and the new mechanism included in WE, while the
former takes into account the rst tier of the system.70 Therefore, as I did in
Section 2, computing both the self-nanced pension wealth, PW
j
T, and the
nal pension P j
s; is useful in order to understand the mechanisms by which
the reform incentives participate in the system and achieves redistribution.
70Workers who did not have enough self-saved pension wealth to self-nance a pension
above the PBS but satisfy the means tested requirements such as they obtain a PBS, have
implicitly a nal pension wealth equivalent to the one to self-nance a PBS.







T;decilT) 8s > T:
It is nanced by three main sources. The rst two, captured by the
accumulated self-saved pension wealth during the working life PW
j
T+1 new
incentives or mechanisms introduced by the reform WE. The last one is the
welfare rst-tier pension in case the retiree is qualied to receive it. Function
  refers to the way that the self-saved pension wealth turns on a pension,
through a procedure that has been modied with the new welfare pillar in-
troduced by the reform. Variables pmg
j
T and decilT set the rst-tier mean
tested conditions. The former indicates the individual accumulated total
number of contributions at retirement.71 Regarding the latter, it indicates
to which household income decile the worker belongs at retirement. Welfare
pensions could be either the PMG and the PASIS if the worker retires before
the reform, and mean-tested conditions are satised according to the vari-
ables pmg
j
T and decilT, or the PBS and APS72 if he retires after the reform
and belongs to the 60% poorest population, again according to the variable
decilT.73
Wages are modeled according to the following process
71Before reform, workers complying with 20 years of contributions and a self-nanced
pension lower than the PMG receive this pension at retirement.
72The reform sets an annual rate of growth of 3% for the PBS and APS. I assume that
the PMAs also grow 3% each year.
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For each period I assume a permanent gender-sector shock 
i;j
t , such as
a technological shock that makes workers less or more valuable or a health
shock that makes workers less productive. I assume a unit root process for

i;j
t (MaCurdy [1982], Abowd and Card [1989]). The degree of persistence
of income shocks is important. If shocks are iid but with a high variance
per period, in order to keep the variance of lifetime earnings constant, par-
ticipation is high across the life cycle as individuals face large amounts of
ongoing uncertainty (precautionary labour supply, Low [2005]). With persis-
tent shocks, the uncertainty translates into heterogeneity late in life, having
dierent eects on the timing of labour participation and on the timing of
consumption (Meghir and Pistaferri [2010]). Shocks are assumed to be freely
correlated across spouses but correlated across sectors. Gender and sectoral
wages w
i;j
t are not observed for each period-sector. Wages are estimated for
each sector, controlling for selection and unobservable heterogeneity using a
four-equation system explained in Section 2.2.1. On the other hand, workers
not only face uncertainty about the sectoral wages but also regarding future
111fertility and marital status.
The household sequential model described above could be written recur-
sively. Beyond age and sex, there is the following household state vector

























f = i) + Vt+1(Zt+1)]
Households choose optimally both earners' consumption, C
j
t, conditional to
a xed earners' labour supply choice set i 2 fNW;I;Fg at the current pe-
riod and the optimal choices in the future represented by the indirect utility
function in period t + 1. Households take into account the probability to
divorce74 d in the future. They consider the optimal choices made for each































The rst term is the expected maximum two-earners' household's indirect
utility function in period t + 1 in the case in which spouses remain married,
74The probability to divorce is exogenously modeled in Section 2.2.3.
75I assume that individuals can divorce and get married just once. Once they have
switched their marital status this becomes an absorbent state.
112which happens with probability 1 d. The last two terms are the weighed,
according to the bargaining power , expected maximum single household's
indirect utility function for both male and female spouses in the case of
divorce, which happens with probability d. Households choose their two-
earners' labour supply comparing their 9 each-period possible consumption






























For every possible state value, the model is solved backward from period
T. I use an equally spaced uniform grid for At and PW
j
t . Expected values








tg. Conditional on the
labour market decision h
j
t = i 2 fNW;I;Fg individual chooses consumption according to
































labour market participation is chosen when comparing the obtained consumption opti-



















































t+1 were interpolated using linear interpolation methods. Numer-
ical complexities are coming not only because the dimension of this problem
is relatively large but also because its structure generates non-concavities in
the value function. The combination of discrete (labour supply) and contin-
uous (consumption) choices generates multiple kinks in the value function
even if the analysis in every period is done conditional to the labour supply
choice. For a good description of this numerical complexity, see Attanasio
et al. [2008]. On the other hand, the welfare tier of the pension system cre-
ates at sections on the terminal value function, which generates more kinks
in the other periods' value functions. One strategy to overcome this issue is
to solve the problem separately to any section between kinks. However, this
strategy implies a large amount of time. I solve the model using a grid for
each earner's consumption, which enables me to skip the diculties due to
the non-concavities. Once optimal consumption is chosen, then each earner's
labour supply is optimized as a standard discrete choice model.
3.2 Baseline Parameters.
In this subsection I discuss the choice of some exogenous or external
parameters used to solve and estimate the model. Such choices are based in
the preexisting literature and observed data. I assume a real interest rate for
the non-pension savings equal to 5%.77 The discount factor is set to 0.98,
77I assume this based on the annual return of the Chilean 30-year central government
114implying a lower discount rate than the interest rate. The annual pension
wealth PWt return was calibrated according to the historical multifunds data
returns. As I explained briey in Section 2, workers can choose among 5 funds
with dierent combinations of risk and return. When workers do not choose
any funds their savings are invested among three default funds dened by age.
I assume dierent interest rates by age according to the default multifunds
structure (Section 2). As age increases, the funds' risk decreases. Returns on
fund B, C and D are assumed to be equal to 11%, 9% and 7%, respectively.
These choices are consistent with the average return of the last 20 years
of the Chilean DC system, which has been around 9% (CRP [2006]). In
particular, I observe whether workers have chosen a specic fund in the year
2009; for these cases I assume that individuals will hold the same fund for all
remaining ages dening the current workers' default fund.78 The next table
summarizes the calibrated coecients.
bonds.
78I do not control for interest rate risk uncertainty. This is important for the assets
allocation and portfolio choice. Dierent interest rate uncertainty between the pension
wealth savings and private savings will aect the optimal portfolio choice made between
them.
115Table 14: Calibrated Coecients
Calibrated Coe￿cients Value
Interest rate (1 + r) 1.05
Discount factor (β) 0.98
Risk aversion (γ) 1.5
Interest rate PW rb,rc,rd 0.11,0.09,0.07
Retirement Age (T) 65
Life expectancy (LE) - Men(Women) 82(86)
Annual non-labor income (nw) 12
Contribution Rate (φ) 0.1
PBS (monthly) US$ 165
PMG (monthly) US$ 212
PASIS(monthly) US$ 119
Estimated Coe￿cients (outside the model)
Standard dev. shock F - Women σζF 0.13
Standard dev. shock I - Women σζI 0.15
Standard dev. shock F - Men σζF 0.10
Standard dev. shock I - Men σζI 0.11
Formal-informal correlation - Both ρζF,I 0.09
(log)
I assume that all workers retire at 65 years old. After retirement s > T
workers stay at home, hj
s = NW, and consume pensions and non-pension
savings, as I explained before. Following the ocial Chilean mortality ta-
bles, the female and male life expectancy is assumed to be 86 and 82 years,
respectively. Risk-aversion coecient  is assumed to be equal to 1.5 in
the utility function, which gives an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
according to the literature (Attanasio and Weber [2010]). The standard de-
viations for formal income innovations are assumed to be equal to 0.13 and
0.10 for women and men, respectively. For the informal sector, the inno-
vations' standard deviation are assumed equal to 0.15 and 0.11 for women
and men, respectively (Hyslop [2001], Meghir and Pistaferri [2010], Attana-
sio et al. [2008]). The correlation coecient between the two sectors shocks
is equal to 0.09. The PBS, PMAs pension are assumed to grow at 3% per
116year, as the regulation has dened. The PMG and PASIS growth is set at
2% according to their historical data.
3.3 Results.
3.3.1 Estimations.
I estimate the model by Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) (McFad-
den [1989]). I match observed data for each age of the female and male
labour life cycle prole between 35 and 65 years old. The following moments
are matched:
1. The average labour market participation of women and men for each
year of the life cycle prole.
2. The average formal labour market participation of women and men for
each year of the life cycle prole.79
3. The average proportion of women working in the formal labour market
within the household for each year of the life cycle prole.
A total of 186 moments are matched using two stages SMM. The combination
of continuous and discrete choices generates a non-smooth non-linear objec-
tive function, which does not make it possible to minimize using a gradient
optimizer solver.80 I minimize the objective function using a direct-search
79I match the fraction of employees working formally over the economically active pop-
ulation.
80Indirect inference (Keane and Smith [2003]) could be used to smooth the objective
function through the use of an auxiliary model. Even though those auxiliary models could
be extremely simple, such as a probability model, this makes the problem less tractable,









4, the borrowing constraint coecient  and the intrahousehold bargaining
power coecient . Household choices are governed by the pre-reform scheme
up until 2008 and by the post-reform structure from 2008. The model is es-
timated considering pre-reform data and then including post reform data.
Table 15 shows the estimated coecients.
Table 15: Estimated Coecients
Variable Coe￿ BR ∆ Coe￿ BR-AR




Marginal male informality cost ψm
1 0.04 0.00
(0.004)




Marginal male formality cost ψm
2 0.02 0.01
(0.015)




Male Informality cost ψm
3 1.23 0.40
(0.040)




Male Formality cost ψm
4 0.85 0.01
(0.013)
Bargaining coe￿cient λ 0.64 0.03**
(0.160)





3 and  
j
4, reecting the cost associated with participating in
the informal and formal sector, take values equal to 2.12 and 2.02 for women
and to 1.23 and 0.85 for men, respectively. The results show that the labour
disutility is larger for the informal sector than for the formal sector,  
j
4 <  
j
3,
as extra estimations are required in each solving iterations.
118for both genders. Workers prefer to work in the formal sector, conditional
on receiving the same wages. The informal sector is generally associated
with more exibility, but at the same time with more uncertainty as it is
related with short-term jobs. As the sectoral disutility dierence is larger
for men than women, it seems that labour stability is more appreciated for
male workers. This reects the fact that men should receive consumption
compensation larger than women in order to work in the informal sector.
labour market participation costs associated with a rise in the family could
explain this dierence in preferences.81 Parameters  
f
3 and  
f
4 for women
correspond to a utility cost of participating in the labour market equivalent
to CLP$ 938,000 (US$ 2,064) and CLP$ 112,7000 (US$ 2,480).
On the other hand, we can see that, for both sectors, the consumption





2, reecting the reduction in the consumption utility while working in the
informal and formal labour sector, respectively, take values equal to 0.05 and





2 > 0 the marginal utility of consumption is larger when participating
than when not participating for both sectors. This result reects the fact
that both consumption and labour supply are complements in utility (Low
[2005], Attanasio et al. [2008], Klaauw [1996]). Negative permanent income
shocks will not only impact the labour supply and consumption directly but
will also aect the latter indirectly through this complementarity. Therefore,
models considering separable utility function underestimate the consumption
81Modeling children-dependent labour market participation cost is one possible exten-
sion of this model.
119response to income changes due to a permanent shock such as a pension
reform.
The parameter  determines spouses' sharing rule of resources within the
household and then their incentives to participate in the labour market and to
save. I exploit the fact that the reform changes the relative female position
within the household exogenously to gain identication of the bargaining
power coecient change. Therefore, the responses in the spouses' behavior,
such as the fraction of married women working in the formal sector, due to
the pension reform, is crucial to provide identication of the change of . It
is expected that the female formal labour market participation response to
the reform would be decreasing in the men Pareto weight bargaining power.
The larger the male decision power, through a large bargaining power , the
lower the labour female response to changes in her pension. This can be
explained by a transfer of resources from the wife to the husband due to the
reform. As spouses' income are consumed by household's member according
to the sharing rule, any female pension improvement increases the husband's
available resources. The estimated bargaining power coecient with pre-
reform date is equal to 0.64, meaning that the male bargaining power within
the household is almost double than female one. When estimations are done
including the post-reform data, the estimated coecient  decreases to 0.61,
showing that the reform has increased the female bargaining power by 0.3
points.
The estimated model matches the observed data well for most of the age
groups, with the exception of the last part of the male life cycle. The average
female formal labour market participation is about 30%. The low female
120labour market participation, and therefore the associated low participation in
the pension system, has been one of the main problems of the Chilean labour
market. Needless to say, this has implied the lack of contributions explaining
the low female replacement rates reproduced by the DC system and the high
scal burden associated with the low female accumulated pension wealth
and consequently with the related welfare pensions. On the other hand, the
male formal labour market participation has been historically higher than
the female one. The fraction of men working in the formal sector is on
average around 55%. The next table reports the fraction of economically
active people working in the formal sector by age and gender considering
those periods in which I observe data. I compare the obtained results using
the estimated model and those coming from the observed data.
Table 16: Model Fit
Model Data Model  Data
Age
36-40 36.4% 37.7% 56.3% 61.5%
41-45 34.1% 35.1% 65.0% 60.3%
45-50 34.4% 33.4% 58.7% 58.3%
51-55 32.3% 32.0% 61.5% 55.0%
56-60 23.8% 22.8% 54.9% 50.2%
61-65 9.8% 7.9% 38.4% 48.6%
Average 28.5% 28.1% 55.8% 55.6%
Simulated and Observed Formality 
Formality is measured as the fraction of population economically active 
contributing to the pension system.
Women Men
Modeling labour choices within the household is important to understand
how spouses react to their partner's income shocks. Even though the pension
121reform aects to women more signicantly than men, as we will see in the
next section, it can impact the male labour market outcomes, as pension
income is pooled within the household.
The next subsections show the main reform impacts. I compute rst the
eects of the reform on the frequency of nal pension income at retirement.
Secondly, I estimate the eects of the reform on formal labour market par-
ticipation. Finally, I show how the reform changes pensions dierently for
dierent cohorts and by gender, impacting the original inequalities originated
by the pre-reform system.
3.3.2 Reform eects on nal pensions.
As I mentioned in Section 1, the reform targets specically certain groups,
such as women in their childbearing periods and young employees. Therefore,
total pension and pension wealth changes are dierent across population
groups. For instance, as some of the subsidies were specically targeted to
women, we can expect a higher improvement for the nal female pensions
than the male pensions. This statement is strongly supported when the
pension frequency before and after the reform is compared for each gender.
The next gure shows the female pension frequency before and after the
reform. The reform increases substantially the female pension received at
retirement. Those women who do not belong to the rst poorest decile of the
population and thus do not qualify for the PASIS pension were withdrawing
low pensions under the pre-reform scenario. This group, together with those
women receiving a PASIS pension, explains the large female pension density
122between zero and CLP$ 100,000 (US$ 220), observed in Figure 26. Before
the reform, the average monthly simulated female pension was CLP$ 113,076
(US$ 248) , increasing to CLP$ 164,603 (US$ 362) after the reform.
Figure 26: Female Pension Before and After the Reform
Frequency of pensions- Women
Even though nal pensions increase for men and women, the change in
their frequency is larger for female pensions, reducing importantly the gap
between them.82 The gender monthly pension dierence is CLP$ 33,655 (US$
74) and CLP$ 24,299 (US$ 53) before and after the reform, respectively.
Previously to the reform, the male pension distribution has been historically
characterized by a bimodal distribution, where the two modes have been
given by the PASIS and the PMG welfare pensions. The next gure shows
the frequency of the monthly simulated male pension at retirement. The
male pension increases on average CLP$ 42,164 (US$93), with a pre-reform
average value of CLP$146,732 (US$323).
82Accomplishing satisfactorily one of the main goals of the reform.
123Figure 27: Male Pension Before and After the Reform
Frequency of pensions- Men
The long-term and short-term eects of the reform are unlikely to be the
same. The main reason to expect dierences is that the impact of the reform
depends on how advanced a cohort was in its life cycle. These dierences arise
both because of the provisos in the new law for individuals who already had
some seniority and because older individuals have fewer years to adapt their
accumulations to the new legislation These eects are particularly important
in the context of the 2008 reform, because younger cohorts will have more
time to react to the elements introduced by the reform. The next two gures
show the frequency of the amount of monthly pensions, measured in CLP$
million, before and after the reform for female83 workers belonging to the
cohorts born in the 1940s and the 1960s. The rst group is composed of
workers who are retiring between 2005 and 201584 and then it is the rst
group of employees retiring under the post-reform new frame. The 1960
cohort group, composed of employees who will retire around 2025-2035, is
83The same graphs for men are in the Appendix B, Section B.1
84I only consider those who have not retired in 2009 yet.
124the rst group that will retire having contributed their entire working life in
the DC system. For both groups, the nal pension will increase importantly
after the reform. The average female pension change is CLP$ 27,271 (US$
60) for those workers belonging to the 1940 cohort and CLP$ 59,778 (US$
131) for those belonging to the 1960 cohort, representing an increment of
33% and 47% of the nal pension before reform, respectively.
Figure 28: Female Pension Cohort 40
Frequency of pensions- Women- Cohort 40
Figure 29: Female Pension Cohort 60
Frequency of pensions- Women- Cohort 60
125As long as the rst-tier reform aects particularly workers with low self-
nanced pensions, because they will qualify for the new welfare pension sub-
sidies (PBS and APS), the change in the nal pension should be larger for
them. The next two gures show the pension frequency for workers with-
out formal education or incomplete primary school and for those who got
a college degree, respectively.85 Even though the dierences between both
groups are still very important after the reform, a signicant gap reduction
can be observed, as the increment of the pension is clearly more important
for non-educated workers.
Figure 30: Female Pension - Non Education
Frequency of pensions- Women- Non education
85The pension frequency for the workers with primary and secondary levels of education
are in the Appendix B, Section B.1.
126Figure 31: Female Pension - College
Frequency of pensions- Women- College
The next section shows how formal labour market participation is aected
by the reform.
3.3.3 Labour market participation eects.
The new welfare tier, through the PBS and the APS, changes the in-
centives for each individual to participate in the pension system. This will
primarily depend on the worker's and her spouse's pre-reform situation. For
instance, workers who were receiving a PASIS pension before the reform will
eventually receive the PBS pension after the reform. However, workers who
do not receive a PASIS but have the same self-nanced pension wealth than
the previous group will potentially, conditional to belonging to the 60% poor-
est population, receive the new non-contributory pension. The reform eects
for these two same self-saved pension wealth groups of workers will dier be-
cause the pension income and the accrual pension rate change will be dierent
for each one. The new incentives could be understood as income and substi-
tution eects largely documented in the literature. As I discussed previously,
127a negative income eect can be expected for those workers who were receiv-
ing a PASIS pension and are currently receiving a PBS pension. However, as
the PBS is complemented with the APS top-up subsidy, the same group of
workers has incentives to contribute for additional years, as they will receive
a higher additional pension due to the subsidy for any extra saved dollar.
Before the reform, those individuals receiving the PASIS and the PMG faced
an implicit marginal tax rate of 100% on their contributions. Any additional
contribution does not increase the nal pension at retirement.86 After the
reform, that implicit marginal tax rate is reduced through the APS subsidy,
generating a positive substitution eect which will increase the probability
to participate in the formal labour market sector. These two eects drive
the nal labour supply reaction for each individual. Moreover, the nal total
aggregate eect will depend on the relative magnitude of each eect and the
distribution of the individuals in the budget constraint represented by Figure
1.87 The results show that the new incentive-compatible subsidy APS does
not fully oset the negative income eect due to the higher expected pension
at retirement. The reform reduces the coverage of the pension system. The
fraction of women and men working formally decreases on average 6.4% and
3.3%, respectively.
The next table shows the simulated nal eect on formal labour market
participation by age and sex in the year 2015. The reform impact is larger
for women than men. The average fraction of women and men older than 60
86At least the extra contribution increases the self-nanced pension such as the new
self-nanced pension will be larger than the current either received PASIS or PMG or the
required number of contributions in order to receive a PMG is satised.
87Simulated budget constraint graphs can be found in the Appendix B, Section B.2.
128years old working in the formal sector decreases about 2.75% and 2.34% due
to the reform, respectively. The reform's impact on formal labour market
participation change across the life cycle prole. These dierences are given
not only due to the dierent changes in the accrual rate and expected pension
wealth for each cohort but also because younger workers discount largely the
future pension, reducing its expected values.
Table 17: Labour Market Reform Eects
Women Men Total
Age
41-45 -10.18% -4.29% -7.37%
45-50 -7.56% -5.30% -6.31%
51-55 -6.01% -2.16% -3.89%
56-60 -4.14% -6.17% -5.12%
61-65 -2.75% -2.34% -2.51%
Education
Non education -11.57% -13.98% -12.66%
Primary  -7.76% -4.27% -6.17%
Secondary  -6.80% 1.41% -2.62%
College -1.85% 5.83% 1.51%
Average -6.37% -3.30% -4.77%
Formality is measured as the fraction of population economically 
active contributing to the system.
Reform Impact - Formality Change - 2015
Therefore, even though the changes introduced by the reform are larger
for younger workers, the nal eect will depend not only on how those changes
are valued at dierent ages but also on the magnitud of the marginal eect af-
fecting the labour supply choices. The reform reduces on average the fraction
129of people contributing to the pension system by 4.8%.
3.3.4 Redistributional eects.
Dened contribution pension schemes tend to replicate inequalities ob-
served in the labour market. As nal pensions depend primarily on the total
accumulated pension wealth during the working lifetime, individuals with
poorer earnings and lower labour market attachment will nish with low
pensions. Moreover, considering that women retire younger and have longer
life spans than men, gender inequality in pensions will be even higher than
the gender income inequality. On the other hand, if a sizeable fraction of the
population participates in the informal labour market, inequality in pensions
can be even higher if contributions to formal schemes have tax advantages.
In the same way I did in Section 2, I focus now on specic measures of in-
equality. In particular, I report the level of the Gini coecient, the standard
deviation of logs, as well as ratios of dierent quantile of the pension and
pension wealth distribution for both men and women. Table 18 shows some
gures for the distribution of the pension at retirement.
130Table 18: Pension Inequality Measures
Women
Cohort 1940 3.78 1.87 2.17 0.50 3.62 0.74 0.48 0.28
Cohort 1950 3.54 2.29 2.01 0.82 2.71 0.96 0.55 0.36
Cohort 1960 2.87 1.53 1.45 0.41 1.14 0.64 0.44 0.26
Total 3.17 1.83 1.75 0.62 2.00 0.81 0.48 0.31
Men 
Cohort 1940 2.05 1.78 0.85 0.70 2.10 0.77 0.36 0.31
Cohort 1950 2.20 1.30 1.04 0.55 0.85 0.62 0.39 0.27
Cohort 1960 2.13 1.32 0.96 0.54 0.84 0.63 0.38 0.27
Total 2.19 1.43 1.01 0.65 1.04 0.68 0.39 0.29
Gini     
AR













Gini     
BR
The reform implies a reduction in inequality for men as well as women.
The overall Gini goes from 0.48 to 0.31 for men and 0.39 to 0.29 for women,
closing importantly the gender gap observed previously to the reform. The
rst two columns in Table 19 contains the 90/10 percentile ratio indicator.
They show us the large pension tail dispersion for the older female cohorts.
This dispersion is just a mirror of the historical labour market conditions. We
can see that, before and after the reform, the gender gaps are considerably
reduced.
I report the same measures of inequality for the self-saved accumulated
pension wealth in Table 19. As I mentioned before, this does not take into
account the rst tier and the redistributive role that it plays and focuses
only on the predicted amount in the individual accounts upon retirement.
Comparison of the inequality indicators considering both variables allows me
131to isolate the eects of the rst-tier reform from the other elements associated
with the contributory tier. Even neglecting the eect of Tier 1 and the
redistributive role it plays, the reform reduces the amount of inequality in
accumulated pension wealth for women.
Table 19: Pension Wealth Inequality Measures
Women
Cohort 1940 4.16 4.30 2.60 2.47 3.66 1.62 0.58 0.51
Cohort 1950 3.57 3.31 1.95 1.75 2.70 1.24 0.58 0.52
Cohort 1960 3.14 2.54 1.67 1.33 1.22 0.98 0.54 0.56
Total 3.36 2.87 1.85 1.50 2.01 1.14 0.56 0.52
Men 
Cohort 1940 2.23 2.27 0.90 0.93 2.09 2.10 0.45 0.45
Cohort 1950 2.45 2.51 1.21 1.24 0.95 1.06 0.43 0.43
Cohort 1960 2.33 2.46 1.08 1.14 0.91 1.75 0.42 0.43
Total 2.37 2.49 1.22 1.25 1.11 1.59 0.44 0.45
Inequality Measures Final Pension Wealth - Before and After Reform
Gini     
BR














The overall Gini coecient for women is reduced from 0.56 to 0.52. For
men, instead, there are virtually no changes in inequality in accumulated
pension wealth. These results are explained by the fact that the changes in
accumulated wealth induced by the reform are mainly driven by the child
subsidies, the divorce regulations, and the other elements I discussed. It is
remarkable that they not only reduce the inequality between men and women
but also inequality among women.
The inequality measures in Table 18 are considerably lower than those in
Table 19. Moreover, the reduction due to the rst tier is more pronounced
132after the reform than before. For instance, if we compare the Gini coecient
for women in Tables 18 and 19, it goes from 0.56 for pension wealth to 0.48
for pension entitlements before the reform. The same gures after the reform
are 0.52 and 0.31: the rst tier after the reform implies a 22 point reduction
in the Gini coecient when going from pension wealth to pension. Before
the reform, the same reduction was only 8 points.
3.4 Reduced form and structural model comparison.
This section compares the results obtained using the structural model
approach with the reduced form approach estimated in Section 2. The latter
estimates the propensity to contribute to the pension system using a discrete
non-linear model with the expected pension wealth at retirement and the
accrual rate as regressors. These two variables, which capture the income and
the substitution eect discussed previously, are computed for each individual
using the forecasted future wages and probabilities to work formally and the
pension system's rules. Once both variables are computed under the pre- and
post-reform, they are instrumentalized, exploiting the fact that the reform
aects dierent groups of the population dierently, such as young people
and both genders. The probability to work formally is estimated according
to a non-linear discrete model comparing the results under the pre- and
post-reform scenarios. This methodology shows explicitly how the additional
pension wealth due to the reform reduced the propensity to contribute to
the pension system. However, it does not take into account the fact that
current changes in formal labour market participation, due to the exogenous
changes in both the pension wealth and the accrual rate introduced by the
133reform, will aect nal pensions. In order to take into account this, a fully
structural model is necessary to control for this behavioral eect. On the
other hand, the reduced-form approach used in Section 2 does not control
for intrahousehold allocation and possibly uneven gender bargaining power.
Considering a spouse's bargaining power within the household is important
to determine the eects of pension on consumption and labour choices, as
pension income is consumed by household's member according to the sharing
rule. The larger pension frequency showed in Section 3.3.2 increases not only
wife's resources at retirement but also her husband's resources. This eect
depends crucially on the bargaining power coecient .
The average male and female pension change using the fully structural
model is 1.8% and 0.01% larger than the results obtained using the reduced
form approach, respectively. On the other hand, both the structural model
and the reduced form approach show that the probability to contribute to
the pension system has decreased as a result of the reform. The latter esti-
mates a 0.4% lower change in formal labour market participation for those
workers older than 40 years old. The income eect, through the new pension
wealth, is under both methodologies, not completely oset by the substitu-
tion eect generated by the changes in the accrual rate. The average female
formal labour market reduction estimated by the reduced form approach is
1.2% lower than the reduction estimated by the structural model. However,
the estimated male formal labour market reduction is 0.5% larger. These
dierences are in line with the fact that men have a larger bargaining power
within the household, according to the estimations.
1344 Conclusion
This thesis studies the relationship between pension incentives and in-
formal labour market participation evaluating an important pension reform
in a dened contribution pension system. Demographic changes such as a
lower number of workers per retirees have triggered many countries to re-
vise their pension systems. Dened contribution pension systems have been
either proposed or implemented across Europe and the United States as an
alternative to those scally unsustainable PAYG systems. However, in many
countries where a DC system has been operating for a while, particularly in
Latin America, the replacement rates have been below the initial expecta-
tions. On the other hand, the DC systems tend to replicate labour market
inequalities, and those workers, such as women, with low labour market at-
tachment, nish with poor pensions. Moreover, if a sizeable fraction of the
population chooses to participate in the informal labour market, in order to
avoid contributions to the system, the scal burden will increase.
DC systems usually mandate individuals to contribute a fraction of their
periodical wages into individual accounts. These contributions earn returns
and are nally mapped on pensions at retirement. Therefore, individuals
accrue pension wealth each period according to their contributed wages and
the associated returns for that contributions. The accrual mechanism com-
bined with the welfare elements of the system generate particular incentives
to contribute to the system and then work formally. Since the 1980s, Chile
has had a DC system, being one the pioneering countries to set a fully funded
pension system. However, after 30 years, the system has not accomplished
135some of the original expectations. In particular, replacement rates have been
below those expected. Therefore, in 2008, Chile implemented its largest pen-
sion system reform since the DC system started in the early 1980s. The
reform sought to prevent old-age poverty, to guarantee a minimum and sta-
ble level of consumption upon retirement and to reduce those inequalities
generated by the DC scheme. It modies completely the welfare tier of the
system, introducing several mechanisms to foster contributions, recognizing
gender dierences and improving competition within the system. Regarding
the system's rst tier, both the contributory minimum pension PMG and the
means-tested welfare pension PASIS were replaced by a at unique pension
PBS, and a pension wealth-decreasing subsidy APS impacting the 60% of
the poorest retired population over 65 years old. Additionally, several new
subsidies and mechanisms, such as the child subsidy, the divorce compensa-
tion mechanism, the new survivor male pensions and the female disability
and survivor insurance were implemented, targeting dierent groups. There-
fore, the pension reform changes the expected pension at retirement through
the new welfare tier in place and secondly through the various mechanisms
introduced to complement the contributory tier. On the other hand, the
accrual rate also changed before and after the reform due to the new welfare
pensions introduced. These two elements, the change in the expected pen-
sion wealth at retirement and the expected change in the accrual rate, could
be understood as an income and substitution eect aecting labour supply
choices. These changes are dierent for dierent groups of the population
not only because some of the new incentives are explicitly targeted towards
specic groups but also because the younger cohorts have more time to react
136optimally to the reform. We can expect not only important changes in the
expected accumulated pension wealth due to the reform but also dierences
across groups for those changes. Therefore, from a theoretical point of view,
the reform has an ambiguous eect on participation in the formal labour
market. The individual eects on the labour market depends on the worker's
pre-reform situation and how the nal pension and the accrual rate changed
due to the reform. When aggregating the income and the substitution eect,
it is possible to determine the empirical nal total eect on the individual
formal labour market participation due to the reform.
The thesis evaluates the eects of the reform using both, a reduced form
approach through a control function methodology and a structural model
solving and estimating a two earner's household consumption, labour supply
and pension saving model. Both gives us evidence about the relationship
between pension incentives and formal labor market participation in a DC
pension system. On the other hand, the both methodologies comparison al-
lows me to extent the bias size on the reform's eect estimation when looking
forward behavior is not considered. Therefore, highlighting the relevance of
considering fully structural model when complex policy reforms are evalu-
ated.
The rst section shows the main features of the Chilean pension sys-
tem and explains carefully the 2008 Chilean pension reform. The reform
introduces important elements, changing the pension incentives and modi-
fying formal labor market participation. The welfare tier of the system was
completely modied. A contributory minimum pension was replaced by a
non-contributory at pension and a decreasing on self-saved pension wealth
137subsidy. At the same time, dierent elements were introduced in the second
system's pillar. A child subsidy, a compensation upon divorce and new struc-
tures for the disability insurance and survivor pension were implemented.
Section 2 nds that the overall eect on the probability to contribute to
pension system is negative as a result of the reform, reducing the participation
in the formal labour market by around 4.1% for those workers older than 40
years old. The results dier by gender and age. The reform reduces the
probability of being formal by 3.2% and 2.8% for women and men between
56 and 65 years old, respectively. This section gives us a good benchmark to
compare the results obtained with a fully behavioral model.
Section 3 solves and estimates a dynamic consumption, labour supply and
pension-saving accumulation life cycle structural model. It complements the
existing literature by incorporating the choice of two sectors in the labour
market, the formal and informal labour sectors, and allowing for intrahouse-
hold bargaining power. Households choose individuals' sector labour supply
and consumption in an environment with uncertainty given by sectoral wage
shocks, future marital status and future fertility choices. The model allows
workers to borrow against non-pension savings, considering current and fu-
ture intrahousehold allocation in consumption and labour supply and future
possibilities to divorce, marriage and the birth of more children. Bargaining
power within the household determines sharing rules for the total pooled re-
sources. I estimate the Pareto weight coecient, exploiting the fact that the
reform changes exogenously the relative female position within the house-
hold. The female formal labour market response within the household due
to the reform is then crucial to gain identication of the bargaining power
138coecient.
Few studies have tried to quantify the reform eects so far. Even though
all of them nd a negative eect of the reform on formal labour market
participation, they either do not control or control only partially for behav-
ioral eects. They do not incorporate the eect of the new current labour
market choices, and eventually future labour choices, due to the reform on
future pensions at retirement. Without a fully structural model that allows
forward-looking behavior, it is not possible to control for this endogenous pro-
cess between pensions at retirement and the complete life cycle path of labour
choices. In this sense, Section 3 considers how labour choices are driven by
future pension at retirement, which at the same time is determined by the
current and future labour market choices.
The nal main results are threefold: First, the reform has increased not
only the self-nanced pension wealth, due to the dierent mechanisms or
subsidies received during the accumulation period, but has also importantly
improved the nal pension due to the rst-tier reform. For those workers
retiring before 2015, the self-nanced pension wealth and the nal pension
increases by on average 0.3% and 22%, respectively. Secondly, the new in-
centives introduced by the reform have reduced formal labour market par-
ticipation. The probability to contribute to pension system has decreased
as a result of the reform, reducing formal labour market participation by
around 4.2% for those workers older than 40 years old. The results are sig-
nicantly higher for women. The reform reduces the probability of being
formal by 2.7% and 2.3% for women and men between 61 and 65 years old,
respectively. Thirdly, even though the nal pension changes have been posi-
139tive for both gender, the female pension improvement has been 32% higher
than the rise for men, reducing importantly the gender inequalities. The
rst tier after the reform implies a 17-point reduction in the Gini coecient.
Before the reform the same reduction was only 6 points. The estimated
bargaining power coecient with pre-reform date is equal to 0.64, meaning
that the male bargaining power within the household is almost double that
of females. When estimations are done including the post-reform data, the
estimated male bargaining power within the household decreases to 0.61,
showing that the reform has increased female bargaining power by about 0.3
points.
Thirdly, the estimates from the reduced-form methodology are somewhat
dierent; for workers over 60, the reform is estimated to have a 0.2% larger
eect on formal labour market participation, whereas for younger workers
between 41 and 45 years old, the estimate is 3% smaller. The main reason
to explain this it is that the trade-o, in terms of pension wealth improve-
ments and formal labour market participation, that the new subsidies and
welfare pensions have raised is not considered by the reduced-form strategy.
The larger pensions due to the reform have reduced the incentives to work
formally, through a direct negative income eect which is not oset by the
positive substitution eect given by the changes in the accrual rate. This
trade-o raises the point about the optimal subsidies and welfare pensions'
role in designing the optimal incentives to increase participation in the pen-
sion systems, reducing scal burden, and guaranteeing minimum levels of
consumption for retirees.
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149A Appendix Section 2
A.1 First Stage.
Table 20: First Stage Estimations - A
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Pension Wealth Pension Wealth Pension Wealth
Age  1.4509*** 1.4357*** 1.3946***
[0.1619] [0.1621] [0.1611]
Age2 -0.0184*** -0.0184*** -0.0179***
[0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018]
Sex (1=Men) 11.3664*** 11.2741*** 11.2823***
[0.4219] [0.4156] [0.4162]
Primary (1=Yes) 6.2561*** 6.2024*** 6.2021***
[0.5287] [0.5171] [0.5184]
Secondary(1=Yes) 12.6418*** 12.5339*** 12.5327***
[0.5824] [0.5696] [0.5711]
Degree(1=Yes) 23.0542*** 22.8575*** 22.8493***
[0.5769] [0.5644] [0.5658]
Married (1=Yes) 0.5231*** 0.4992** 0.4974**
[0.2020] [0.2018] [0.2018]
Sex*Married 1.1103*** 1.1706*** 1.1718***
[0.2778] [0.2776] [0.2775]
Number Children 0-3 -0.3199** -0.3389** -0.3356**
[0.1327] [0.1329] [0.1328]
Number Children 4-5 -0.2135* -0.2325* -0.2298*
[0.1277] [0.1280] [0.1279]
Number Children 6-13 0.8387*** 0.8331*** 0.8378***
[0.1041] [0.1041] [0.1040]
Number Children 14-18 0.6442*** 0.6385*** 0.6387***
[0.1045] [0.1046] [0.1045]
Sex*Number Children 0-3 -0.1107 -0.0882 -0.0951
[0.1789] [0.1791] [0.1790]
Sex*Number Children 4-5 -0.3217* -0.2986* -0.3011*
[0.1733] [0.1736] [0.1735]
Sex*Number Children 6-13 -0.6473*** -0.6361*** -0.6465***
[0.1349] [0.1349] [0.1348]
Sex*Number Children 14-18 -0.5601*** -0.5502*** -0.5570***
[0.1375] [0.1376] [0.1375]
Trend 0.7695*** 0.7740*** 0.7689***
[0.1292] [0.1277] [0.1279]
Cohort 1950*Year 2003 0.4911 0.5011 0.4967
[0.5301] [0.5314] [0.5311]
Cohort 1960*Year 2003 -0.3778 -0.3822 -0.3784
[0.5198] [0.5211] [0.5207]
Cohort 1970*Year 2003 -1.5666*** -1.4914*** -1.4804***
[0.5300] [0.5312] [0.5309]
Cohort 1980*Year 2003 -0.8627 -0.6862 -0.6200
[0.6778] [0.6799] [0.6792]
Cohort 1950*Year 2004 -0.3185 -0.2406 -0.2762
[0.5326] [0.5346] [0.5335]
Cohort 1960*Year 2004 -1.3010** -1.2529** -1.2673**
[0.5312] [0.5330] [0.5321]
First Stage Estimations - Linear Panel Data RE
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Cont. (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Pension Wealth Pension Wealth Pension Wealth
Cohort 1970*Year 2004 -1.8143*** -1.7116*** -1.7013***
[0.5564] [0.5578] [0.5571]
Cohort 1980*Year 2004 -1.6727** -1.4084** -1.3801*
[0.7077] [0.7103] [0.7089]
Cohort 1950*Year 2005 -0.9162* -0.6572 -0.7645
[0.5383] [0.5431] [0.5393]
Cohort 1960*Year 2005 -2.2319*** -2.0004*** -2.0885***
[0.5508] [0.5547] [0.5516]
Cohort 1970*Year 2005 -2.5727*** -2.3171*** -2.3685***
[0.5986] [0.6015] [0.5992]
Cohort 1980*Year 2005 -2.8160*** -2.3351*** -2.4224***
[0.7592] [0.7632] [0.7603]
Cohort 1950*Year 2006 -1.1229** -0.9065* -1.0080*
[0.5362] [0.5395] [0.5371]
Cohort 1960*Year 2006 -2.7733*** -2.6064*** -2.6711***
[0.5690] [0.5717] [0.5695]
Cohort 1970*Year 2006 -3.2888*** -3.1208*** -3.1418***
[0.6458] [0.6476] [0.6459]
Cohort 1980*Year 2006 -3.7117*** -3.2830*** -3.3248***
[0.8169] [0.8194] [0.8174]
Cohort 1950*Year 2007 -1.3381** -1.1844** -1.2820**
[0.5459] [0.5491] [0.5467]
Cohort 1960*Year 2007 -3.3853*** -3.2811*** -3.3260***
[0.6023] [0.6049] [0.6026]
Cohort 1970*Year 2007 -3.9969*** -3.9099*** -3.8935***
[0.7110] [0.7130] [0.7107]
Cohort 1980*Year 2007 -4.4291*** -4.1087*** -4.1424***
[0.8971] [0.8996] [0.8969]
Cohort 1950*Year 2008 -0.0415 0.1580 0.0110
[0.5542] [0.5599] [0.5549]
Cohort 1960*Year 2008 0.1794 0.2818 0.2049
[0.6380] [0.6428] [0.6381]
Cohort 1970*Year 2008 1.7375** 1.8437** 1.8451**
[0.7813] [0.7848] [0.7806]
Cohort 1980*Year 2008 2.8824*** 3.3786*** 3.2973***
[0.9853] [0.9895] [0.9849]
Cohort 1950*Year 2009 -0.1972 -0.0112 -0.1462
[0.5638] [0.5700] [0.5645]
Cohort 1960*Year 2009 -0.0474 0.0448 -0.0094
[0.6778] [0.6829] [0.6777]
Cohort 1970*Year 2009 1.8029** 1.8465** 1.8765**
[0.8568] [0.8612] [0.8558]
Cohort 1980*Year 2009 3.1952*** 3.5280*** 3.4385***
[1.0803] [1.0846] [1.0791]
Sex*Year 2003 0.0862 0.0647 0.0595
[0.2035] [0.2040] [0.2039]
First Stage Estimations - Linear Panel Data RE
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Cont. (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Pension Wealth Pension Wealth Pension Wealth
Sex*Year 2004 0.3816* 0.3749* 0.3766*
[0.2035] [0.2040] [0.2039]
Sex*Year 2005 0.5867*** 0.5916*** 0.5858***
[0.2043] [0.2048] [0.2047]
Sex*Year 2006 0.8697*** 0.8789*** 0.8706***
[0.2019] [0.2024] [0.2023]
Sex*Year 2007 1.1487*** 1.1457*** 1.1465***
[0.2028] [0.2032] [0.2031]
Sex*Year 2008 -3.9729*** -4.0226*** -4.0209***
[0.2037] [0.2042] [0.2041]
Sex*Year 2009 -3.5061*** -3.5280*** -3.5324***
[0.2046] [0.2051] [0.2050]
Accrual Rate* Group Age <25 0.3462***
[0.0282]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 26-30 0.4015***
[0.0229]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 31-35 0.5833***
[0.0271]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 36-40 0.6741***
[0.0351]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 41-45 0.7638***
[0.0495]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 46-50 0.9918***
[0.0750]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 51-55 0.8891***
[0.1026]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 56-60 1.3115***
[0.1694]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 61-65 2.0004***
[0.3462]




Constant -24.1849*** -23.3128*** -22.6547***
[4.5164] [4.4601] [4.4557]
Observations 59,497 59,497 59,497
Number of folio 7,877 7,877 7,877
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . We control for time and cohort 
dummies.
First Stage Estimations - Linear Panel Data RE
152A.2 Second Stage.
Table 23: Male Second Stage Estimations
Men 
Variables NO IV  IV  CF
Age  -0.0761*** 0.0161 0.0233*
[0.0218] [0.0342] [0.0122]
Age2 0.0011*** 0.0001 0.0061***
[0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0010]
Primary (1=Yes) 0.2990*** 0.7908*** 0.3381***
[0.0806] [0.1282] [0.0473]
Secondary(1=Yes) 0.4179*** 1.3808*** 0.6522***
[0.0936] [0.2122] [0.0912]
Degree(1=Yes) 0.2332** 1.8485*** 0.9973***
[0.0981] [0.3521] [0.1672]
Married 0.2433*** 0.3973*** 0.4663***
[0.0458] [0.0528] [0.0531]
Number Children 0-3 0.0950*** 0.0860** 0.0702***
[0.0337] [0.0347] [0.0199]
Number Children 4-5 0.0737** 0.0510 0.0218
[0.0337] [0.0349] [0.0227]
Pension Wealth  0.0509*** 0.0016 -0.0078
[0.0046] [0.0143] [0.0070]
Pension Wealth*Age -0.0007*** -0.0013*** -0.0004***
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0001]
Accrual Rate -0.1226*** -0.1808*** -0.1900***
[0.0281] [0.0297] [0.0193]
Accrual Rate*Age 0.0061*** 0.0095*** 0.0085***
[0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0006]
Constant 0.9235*** 1.0259***
Observations 32,719 32,719 32,719
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Pension Wealth 
variable is intrumented by groups dummies interacted with year dummies. 
Pension Wealth and Accrual Rate  are both measured in Ch$1000000.
Dicrete Choice Model Estimations - Pr. to Contribute=1
153154A.3 Marginal Eects.
Table 24: Marginal Eects Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV-RE-PwWomen IV-RE-PwMen CF-PwWomen CF-PwMen
Age  0.1601*** -0.0484 0.0574*** 0.0188
[0.0478] [0.0404] [0.0163] [0.0149]
Age2 -0.0019*** 0.0009* -0.0007*** -0.0002
[0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Married (1=Yes) -0.4128*** 0.3755*** -0.3631*** 0.4861***
[0.0514] [0.0524] [0.0181] [0.0532]
Number Children 0-3 -0.3662*** 0.0911*** -0.2304*** 0.0694***
[0.0392] [0.0349] [0.0213] [0.0200]
Number Children 4-5 -0.2003*** 0.0535 -0.1201*** 0.0192
[0.0386] [0.0349] [0.0249] [0.0227]
Number Children 6-13 -0.1810*** 0.0326 -0.1177*** 0.0685***
[0.0337] [0.0245] [0.0129] [0.0169]
Number Children 14-18 -0.0030 -0.0190 0.0022 0.0389**
[0.0338] [0.0267] [0.0149] [0.0168]
Pension Wealth* Group Age <25 -0.0505** -0.0313** -0.0333*** -0.0216***
[0.0198] [0.0142] [0.0089] [0.0072]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 26-30 -0.0358* -0.0259* -0.0262*** -0.0185***
[0.0189] [0.0138] [0.0084] [0.0069]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 31-35 -0.0337* -0.0318** -0.0224*** -0.0216***
[0.0191] [0.0139] [0.0087] [0.0071]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 36-40 -0.0392** -0.0367*** -0.0263*** -0.0234***
[0.0195] [0.0140] [0.0088] [0.0071]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 41-45 -0.0380* -0.0398*** -0.0272*** -0.0282***
[0.0206] [0.0145] [0.0092] [0.0073]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 46-50 -0.0376* -0.0477*** -0.0239** -0.0304***
[0.0213] [0.0147] [0.0094] [0.0073]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 51-55 -0.0376* -0.0532*** -0.0262*** -0.0329***
[0.0225] [0.0153] [0.0097] [0.0075]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 56-60 -0.0603** -0.0674*** -0.0268*** -0.0383***
[0.0241] [0.0159] [0.0101] [0.0077]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 61-65 -0.0650** -0.0718*** -0.0338*** -0.0412***
[0.0285] [0.0173] [0.0110] [0.0083]
Accrual Rate* Group Age <25 0.1513*** 0.0510*** 0.1164*** 0.0308***
[0.0195] [0.0116] [0.0162] [0.0085]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 26-30 0.1393*** 0.0669*** 0.1196*** 0.0357***
[0.0167] [0.0116] [0.0111] [0.0075]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 31-35 0.0937*** 0.1210*** 0.0990*** 0.0609***
[0.0185] [0.0170] [0.0112] [0.0097]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 36-40 0.2226*** 0.1674*** 0.2971*** 0.1135***
[0.0290] [0.0227] [0.0191] [0.0150]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 41-45 0.1902*** 0.1825*** 0.3438*** 0.1735***
[0.0337] [0.0278] [0.0234] [0.0188]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 46-50 0.1772*** 0.2900*** 0.3434*** 0.2473***
[0.0424] [0.0482] [0.0300] [0.0302]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 51-55 0.4150*** 0.3999*** 0.7338*** 0.3551***
[0.1024] [0.0708] [0.0617] [0.0478]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 56-60 1.0861*** 0.8238*** 1.1277*** 0.7503***
[0.2108] [0.1387] [0.1215] [0.0927]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 61-65 0.1594 0.4257*** 0.5860** 0.3939***
[0.3006] [0.1651] [0.2885] [0.1173]
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Pension Wealth variable is intrumented by groups dummies interacted with 
year dummies. Pension Wealth and Accrual Rate  are both measured in Ch$1000000.
Marginal Effects - Probit Model, Instrumental Variables and Control Fucntion Approach
155A.4 Scenarios.
Table 25: Male Marginal Eects Estimations - Scenarios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Pr=0.1 Pr=0.3 Pr=0.5 Pr=0.7 Pr=0.9
Age  0.0462*** 0.0413** -0.0731*** -0.0243 -0.0242
[0.0158] [0.0167] [0.0197] [0.0189] [0.0204]
Age2 -0.0004** -0.0004** 0.0007*** 0.0004** 0.0004**
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Married (1=Yes) 0.4739*** 0.3039*** 0.3900*** 0.1164*** 0.0745
[0.0402] [0.0329] [0.0456] [0.0448] [0.0571]
Number Children 0-3 0.0287 0.5643*** 0.7548*** 0.1660* 0.0493
[0.0198] [0.0570] [0.0869] [0.0891] [0.1159]
Number Children 4-5 -0.0144 0.8733*** 1.2282*** -0.0564 -0.3633
[0.0229] [0.1103] [0.1741] [0.1886] [0.2660]
Number Children 6-13 0.0841*** 0.4722*** 0.5740*** 0.1592** 0.0756
[0.0159] [0.0418] [0.0609] [0.0656] [0.0859]
Number Children 14-18 0.0757*** 0.0333* 0.0419** 0.0465** 0.0570***
[0.0178] [0.0197] [0.0195] [0.0198] [0.0208]
Pension Wealth* Group Age <25 -0.0455*** -0.0467*** -0.0342*** 0.0209* 0.0296*
[0.0071] [0.0069] [0.0088] [0.0109] [0.0159]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 26-30 -0.0274*** -0.0233*** -0.0315*** 0.0256** 0.0352**
[0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0090] [0.0108] [0.0156]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 31-35 -0.0352*** -0.0267*** -0.0343*** 0.0240** 0.0351**
[0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0091] [0.0107] [0.0155]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 36-40 -0.0373*** -0.0279*** -0.0381*** 0.0246** 0.0337**
[0.0060] [0.0060] [0.0091] [0.0108] [0.0155]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 41-45 -0.0409*** -0.0336*** -0.0431*** 0.0232** 0.0325**
[0.0063] [0.0062] [0.0092] [0.0107] [0.0155]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 46-50 -0.0404*** -0.0339*** -0.0451*** 0.0208* 0.0343**
[0.0064] [0.0064] [0.0092] [0.0107] [0.0156]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 51-55 -0.0404*** -0.0376*** -0.0498*** 0.0186* 0.0322**
[0.0067] [0.0066] [0.0094] [0.0106] [0.0155]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 56-60 -0.0420*** -0.0426*** -0.0552*** 0.0124 0.0300*
[0.0070] [0.0069] [0.0096] [0.0107] [0.0155]
Pension Wealth* Group Age 61-65 -0.0507*** -0.0452*** -0.0637*** -0.0004 0.0189
[0.0078] [0.0076] [0.0103] [0.0117] [0.0160]
Accrual Rate* Group Age <25 0.4894*** 0.5042*** 0.0985*** 0.1416*** 0.1773***
[0.0296] [0.0301] [0.0264] [0.0251] [0.0321]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 26-30 0.2222*** 0.1783*** 0.0415*** 0.0297 0.0315
[0.0172] [0.0155] [0.0091] [0.0197] [0.0323]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 31-35 0.3315*** 0.2010*** 0.0928*** 0.0712** 0.0434
[0.0236] [0.0169] [0.0133] [0.0295] [0.0487]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 36-40 0.4637*** 0.2732*** 0.2238*** 0.0838*** 0.1171*
[0.0300] [0.0223] [0.0234] [0.0288] [0.0634]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 41-45 0.6002*** 0.4272*** 0.3368*** 0.1165*** 0.2010***
[0.0385] [0.0311] [0.0322] [0.0283] [0.0614]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 46-50 0.6641*** 0.4303*** 0.3637*** 0.1676*** 0.1461**
[0.0504] [0.0379] [0.0379] [0.0446] [0.0593]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 51-55 0.6673*** 0.7925*** 0.6022*** 0.2085*** 0.3852***
[0.0558] [0.0652] [0.0575] [0.0499] [0.0764]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 56-60 0.8329*** 1.1362*** 1.1311*** 0.4922*** 0.3032**
[0.0811] [0.1038] [0.1135] [0.1125] [0.1404]
Accrual Rate* Group Age 61-65 1.5722*** 1.0209*** 1.5152*** 1.5054*** 1.1451***
[0.1852] [0.1450] [0.1908] [0.4056] [0.2861]
Residual 0.0415*** 0.0405*** 0.0542*** -0.0198* -0.0293*
[0.0067] [0.0066] [0.0097] [0.0119] [0.0163]
Marginal Effects Probit Dicrete Choice Model Estimations - Men - Probability to Contribute=1
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, dummies.  Pension Wealth and Accrual Rate  are 
measured  both in Ch$1000000. Dummies years and cohorts included.
156A.5 Outcomes of interest
A.5.1 Changes in the frequency of pensions resulting from the
reform.
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A.5.2 Changes in the frequency of the gender pension dierences.
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A.5.3 Changes in accumulated pension wealth before and after
the reform.
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A.5.4 Changes in poverty levels before and after the reform for
elderly people, in particular, for elderly women.
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160A.5.5 Changes in the probability to contribute and changes in the
frequency of contributions.
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161A.5.6 Pension Changes, Accrual Rate Changes and Coverage
Table 26: Pension and Accrual Rate Change





















Pension (PW) and Accrual Rate (AC) Change - Year 2009
162Table 27: Budget Constrain Frequency
Group PASIS PMG-HAPS PMG-LAPS SELF-APS SELF
Men
2008-2012 2.89% 9.31% 0.00% 26.93% 60.87%
2013-2017 7.32% 11.13% 0.00% 34.42% 47.14%
2018-2022 7.28% 11.32% 0.00% 37.20% 44.20%
2023-2027 7.44% 11.44% 3.76% 34.39% 42.98%
2028-2032 7.76% 11.73% 7.45% 36.82% 36.24%
2033-2037 6.02% 17.94% 9.76% 30.02% 36.26%
2038-2042 4.40% 15.35% 10.92% 29.50% 39.83%
2043-2047 5.39% 21.70% 15.85% 25.34% 31.72%
Women
2008-2012 11.62% 10.71% 0.00% 33.46% 44.22%
2013-2017 12.23% 4.93% 0.00% 31.85% 50.98%
2018-2022 9.56% 8.24% 0.00% 31.85% 50.34%
2023-2027 14.07% 6.91% 4.96% 33.24% 40.81%
2028-2032 15.80% 6.75% 5.76% 40.59% 31.09%
2033-2037 16.98% 10.96% 5.26% 35.38% 31.42%
2038-2042 16.30% 10.78% 5.89% 34.73% 32.31%
2043-2047 14.85% 8.35% 4.28% 40.94% 31.58%
BUDGET CONSTRAIN GROUPS
B Appendix Section 3
B.1 Changes in the distribution of pensions resulting
from the reform.
Next tables show the frequency of the male pension income before and
after the reform for dierent cohorts and educational groups.
163Figure 44: Male Frequency of Pensions by Cohort
Frequency of pensions- Men- Cohort 40
Frequency of pensions- Men- Cohort 60
164Figure 45: Male Frequency of Pensions by Educational Groups
Frequency of pensions- Men-Non education
Frequency of pensions- Men- College
B.2 Budget constraint simulations.
The next two Figures show the empirical simulated budget constraints
which were explained in Section 1. We can observe important dispersion in
the nal pension income for the same self-saved pension wealth. This happens
because individuals are retiring at dierent periods and welfare pensions after
the reform, PBS and APS, and before the reform, PMG and PASIS, are
assumed to growth each period 3% and 2%, respectively. We can observe
that nal allocations are dierent for men and women, which is explained
165not only due to dierences in the self-nanced pension wealth but also in
the comply of the mean tested requirements enabling them to qualify for the
welfare tier.
Figure 46: Female Budget Constraint































Figure 47: Male Budget Constraint





























1. Sample. Non-retired AFP (No INP) workers between 20 and 65 years
old.
2. Retirement age: I am assuming that all individuals will retire at 65
years old. There is not early retirement.
3. Interest rate: I assume dierent interest rates by age according the
default multi-funds structure, where Fund B return =11%, Fund C
return=9% and Fund D return=7%. I observe if workers have chosen a
fund in year 2009, in these cases I assume that individuals will hold the
same fund for all remaining ages dening the current workers' default
fund.
4. Recognition bond: Individuals that contributed to the old PAYG sys-
tem (pre-80s) will receive at retirement a bond (RB) recognizing those
contributions. I am assuming a RB·s annual real return equal to 4.5%
. For individuals who have not claimed the RB I do not observe its
value. For those cases I am imputing average values by age, education
and gender groups.
5. Discount factor: I am assuming a discount factor equal to 0.98.
6. PMG/PASIS/PBS and PMAS values: For the welfare pensions before
(PMG and PASIS) and after (PBS and PMAS) the reform I am us-
ing the following CLP$ values dened by law: PASIS=CLP$ 44,186;
167PMG=CLP$96,391; PBS=CLP$75,000; PMAS=CLP$70,000 at 2008,
CLP$120,000 at 2009, CLP$150,000 at 2010, CLP$200,000 at 2011 and
CLP$255,000 at 2012 onwards.
7. PBS and PMAs growth: I am assuming an annual rate of growth equal
to 2% and 3% for the PMG and PASIS, respectively.
8. I am assuming a gender disability premium rate dierence equal to
0.2%.
9. Partner's pension wealth fraction as compensation upon divorce equal
to 30%
10. Minimum wage: Starting from the 2009 Minimum Wage equal to CLP$
165,000 I am assuming an annual rate of growth equal to 3%.
11. Cap contributions: 64 UF (CLP$20,319) at 2009. UF is an unit of
account used in Chile. The exchange rate between the UF and the
Chilean peso is constantly adjusted to ination.
12. Pensions: All retirees are choosing a phased withdrawal pension modal-
ity at retirement.
168